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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to determine the presence or 
absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to 
identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsurgen- 
cy. The thesis examines the place of counterinsurgency in 
Soviet military thought and compares the Soviet 
counterinsurgent campaigns in Soviet Central Asia, the 
Ukraine, Lithuania, and Afghanistan. The thesis concludes 
that a pattern of Soviet counterinsurgency evolved in spite 
of the absence of an official doctrine but that the Soviet 
defeat in Afghanistan may inspire changes in the Soviet 
approach to counterinsurgency. 
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I. JNTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to determine the presence or 
absence of a Soviet doctrine of counterinsurgency and to 
identify the historical patterns of Soviet counterinsur- 
gency. The development of these central themes should 
contribute to the secondary goals of the paper; first, to 
establish a fuller basis of comparison than is currently 
used in examination of Soviet and Soviet-advised 
counterinsurgent campaigns, and second, to add some 
historical depth to the developing body of work on Soviet 
counterinsurgency. This should allow for some useful 
generalizations about the Soviet approach to 
counterinsurgent warfare to be derived. 
Counterinsurgency became a preoccupation of the U.S. 
military during the late fifties and early sixties. The 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam sustained interest in 
counterinsurgency and new challenges to U.S. interests in 
Latin America, Asia, and Africa have renewed attention to 
issues of counterinsurgency in the eighties.' Although the 
'see as an example of the literature of the earlier 
period: T.N. Greene, m e  Guerrilla--And How to Ficrht Him (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962). General treatments of the 
subject characteristic of the later period are: Robert B. 
Asprey, War in the Shadows. the Guerrilla in History (New 
York: Doubleday and Company, 1975) and Walter Laquer, 
Guerrilla. A ~istorical and critical -study (Boston: ~ittle, 
Brown and Company, 1976). Richard H. Schultz, The Soviet 
Union and Revolutionarv Warfare (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
counterinsurgency literature developed during both of these 
periods is extensive, little attention was paid to the 
Marxist or, more specifically, the Soviet experience of 
counterinsurgency since the focus was on communist 
insurgencies in the The security assistance policies 
outlined by the U.S. Regional Conflict Working Group in 1988 
highlight the need to correct this deficiency. 3 
Attention began to focus on Soviet counterinsurgency 
only after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Most 
examinations of Soviet methods of counterinsurgency have 
generally fallen into three groups: case studies of the 
I Soviet war in Afghanistan, historical comparisons between the Afghan war and previous Soviet campaigns against Muslim 
Press, 1988) provides a more focused examination and is one of 
the latest examples of the preoccupation with communist and 
Soviet-inspired insurgency. 
'~eglect of the subject is evident in bibliographies of 
insurgency and counterinsurgency and Current Militarv 
Literature 4, no. 3 (1986): 35-36 commented that Rod 
Paschallts "Marxist Counterinsurgencies," Parameters 16, no. 
2 (Summer 1986): 2-15 was, "...the first time in (the 
experience of the index editors) that this aspect of COIN 
(counterinsurgency) has been properly addressed." 
3~egional Conflict Working Group, .C- 
Securitv Assistance as a U.S. Policv Instrument in the Third 
World, May 1988; and Su~~ortina U.S. Strateav for Third World 
Conflict, June 1988, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. One aim of the policies is to improve aid to 
freedom fighters, which would have as a prerequisite an 
improved understanding of Soviet counterinsurgency. See 
Sup~ortina U.S. Strateuv for Third World Conflict, 55. 
4 insurgents (primarily the Central Asian Basmachi), and 
comparative surveys of the counterinsurgency campaigns of 
the Soviets in Afghanistan and various Soviet allies 
fighting insurgents since 1975.' For the purpose of 
establishing the patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency the 
limited number of cases in the first two approaches is too 
narrow. Although the third approach examines more cases, it 
mixes dissimilar cases and blurs distinctions between Soviet 
methods of counterinsurgency and the methods of Soviet 
advised militaries fighting insurgencies. 
A. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This paper examines Soviet thought on counterinsurgent 
warfare and develops a comparative case study of the Soviet 
Army in four counterinsurgent campaigns; the Basmachi 
uprising between 1918 and 1931, the post-World War I1 
Ukrainian and Lithuanian uprisings, and the war in 
~f~hanistan. This approach offers the advantages of 
'one of the earliest was: Alexandre Fennigsen, The Soviet 
Union and Muslim Guerrilla Wars. 1920-1981 (Santa Monica: 
Rand, August 1981), N-1707/1. 
 h he first to treat the subject were: Mark N. Katz, 
ltAnti-Soviet Insurgencies: Growing Trend or Passing Phase?" 
30, no. 2 (Summer 1986) : 361-391; and Rod Paschall, 
ItMarxist Counterinsurgencies, It parameters 16, no. 2 (Summer 
1986): 2-15. 
6~hese four cases were selected based on the methods used 
by both sides, the general nature of the conflict and its 
duration, omitting counterrevolutionary activity in the Civil 
War, the Kronstadt uprising, the uprising in the Caucasus, and 
the rebellion in Tambov Province. 
3 
narrowing the type of cases to only Soviet, not Soviet 
advised, counterinsurgencies while increasing the time-span 
and number of cases of purely Soviet controlled insurgencies 
examined. 
The work is based on English language sources and 
English translations of Russian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian 
sources. The availability of sources for each case study 
varied widely. The war in Afghanistan has generated volumes 
of material in the West and Glasnost has made many Soviet 
accounts of the war available as well. The war in 
Afghanistan has stimulated renewed interest in the Basmachi 
uprising, thus expanding the volume of work on that conflict 
but the available material is limited by the lack of 
accounts from the Basmachi side and consequent heavy 
reliance on Soviet sources. Researchers of the Ukrainian 
and Lithuanian resistance movements are handicapped with the 
opposite problem--an abundance of accounts from the side of 
the resistance but little available material from the Soviet 
side.' As much care as possible has been taken to glean the 
most objective accounts from among a limited selection of 
-- 
'~uba Fa j fer, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Documents, If 
Problems of Communism 37, no. 5 (September-October 1988): 77- 
84 describes the ongoing publication of German and Ukrainian 
documents on the Ukrainian Insurgent Army entitled The 
Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insuraent Army. The primary 
sources contained in this collection (printed in German and 
Ukrainian) should lead to a more accurate record of the 
Ukrainian uprising. The Chronicle, however, still leaves the 
Soviet side of the conflict untold. 
available material on the Basmachi, Ukrainian and Lithuanian 
uprisings. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
Western analysts of insurgent warfare have developed 
numerous definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency. 
The following concise definitions can serve as the basis for 
development of one possible definition of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency from the Soviet point of view: 
Insurgency is the attempt by a militarily inferior faction 
(the insurgents) operating within a geo-political system, 
by use of guerrilla warfare and population control 
measures to usurp control of that system from the 
militarily dominant faction (the de facto government). 
Counterinsurgency is therefore defined as: 
The attempt by the de facto government or other 
non-insurgent factions to prevent the insurgents from 
achieving control of the geo-political system. 
The author of these definitions elaborates further by 
identifying resistance warfare as a sub-category of 
insurgency defined as: 
... fought between a foreign occupier of a territory on the 
one hand, and the inhabitants of the territory who oppose 
such occupation on the other. "Foreignqq is used to 
designate a de facto government whose main base of support 
(political, economic, military) is located outside of tFe 
geo-political system where the insurgency is occurring. 
To refine this definition it is important to note that, 
for the Soviets, insurgency or resistance warfare fought 
'~erry A. Rambo, "The Concept of Revolutionary Warfare, 
in: Strateaies of Revolutionarv Warfare, ed., Jerry M. Tinker 
(New Delhi: S. Chand and Company, 1969), 6. 
against a socialist regime is counterrevolutionary warfare 
rather than revolutionary warfare, as it is considered in 
the West. Counterrevolution is, "a regressive social 
process that is the direct opposite of revolution," which 
can take the form of, "armed resistance, civil war, 
mutinies, conspiracies, acts of sabotage, subversive 
activity, foreign intervention, and blockade.tt0 Peter Vigor 
notes: 
... movements directed against the rule of a communist 
party can never be regarded by communists as "wars of 
national liberation." In order to qualify for this title, 
a given war must be directed against a feudal or 
"bourgeois" subjugator. But when it is indeed against 
such a subjugator that the war in question is directed, 
then in modern times (i.e., since the October Revolution) 
it is invariably termed a "war of national liberation,It 
and is given automatic approval by the Soviet Communist 
Party. 10 
C. SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE FUTURE 
Mark Katz has asked whether anti-Soviet insurgencies are 
11 a growing trend or a passing phase. This paper 
demonstrates that since 1917 armed resistance has been a 
frequent response where Soviet power has been newly 
established or reasserted, certainly a frequent enough 
9 A.M. Prokharov, ed., The Great Soviet Encvclo~edia, a 
translation of the 3rd ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1976) S.V. 
*Tounterrevol~tion,~ by Iv. A. Krasin. 
lopeter H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War. Peace and 
Neutrality (Boston: Rutledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 42. 
"~atz, "Anti-Soviet Insurgencies: Growing Trend or 
Passing Phase?" 361. 
response to be called a trend. This pattern continues today 
in anti-communist insurgencies in almost every world region 
where the Soviets are involved as advisors.12 The West can 
therefore expect the Soviets to be involved in 
counterinsurgent campaigns, either directly or as advisors, 
for the foreseeable future. Less certain but in the realm 
of possibility is that current unrest among the minority 
nationalities in the Soviet Union may eventually develop 
into armed resistance movements in one or another of the 
minority republics of the USSR. The rising phenomenon of 
Islamic fundamentalism and the uncertain repercussions of 
the Soviet failure in Afghanistan give this once remote 
prospect a certain degree of plausibility in Soviet Central 
Asia. In terms of Soviet involvement in counterinsurgent 
campaigns, the past is prelude and scholarly investigation 
of Soviet counterinsurgency becomes an important part of the 
body of work on Soviet military affairs. 
12 See Rod Paschall, "Marxist Counterinsurgencies," 
Parameters 16, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 2-15. 
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11. SOVIET THOUGHT ON COUNTERINSURGENCY 
The Soviets do not take war lightly. Warfighting and 
preparation for war has been central to Soviet ideas on 
national survival since 1917 and it is reasonable to say 
that the Soviet Union devotes more "intellectual capital" to 
preparation for war than any other nation in the world.13 
This attitude towards war was likely eventually to evolve 
from the Bolsheviks' recognition of the natural antagonism 
between communism and capitalism. The Civil War turned this 
likelihood into an immediate reality, speeding the 
development of a Marxist-Leninist military theory and 
hardening the Bolshevik perception of war. 14 
The founding fathers of the Soviet state recognized war 
as an important social process and acknowledged the 
13 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, eds., The 
Soviet Art of War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 287. 
14peter H. Vigor, in: V 
Neutrality (Boston: Rutledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 12, 
describes the October Revolution (and the civil war that 
followed) as a "watershed in the development of the Soviet 
communists8 attitude towards war.. . .I' since prior to the 
revolution the communist attitude was based on ltphilosophical 
theorizingto but after the revolution Lenin, as de factor head 
of state, had operational control of a real army facing 
internal and external aggression. John Erickson, in his 
seminal work on the development of the Red Amy, The Soviet 
Hiah Command (New York:.St. Martin's Press, 1962) describes in 
detail the collision of pre-revolution theory with the 
practical necessities of the civil war and the eventual 
victory of expedience over theory. 
Clausewitzian dictum of war as a continuation of politics by 
15 other means. Yet the philosophical theorizing on war that 
preceded the October Revolution did not result in the 
development of a comprehensive Marxist-Leninist military 
doctrine. As D.F. White notes, it was left to Trotsky, 
Frunze, Tukhachevsky, and others who had experienced the 
civil war and its accompanying external conflicts to develop 
a military doctrine based on Marxism-Leninism. Trotsky's 
defeat by Frunze, Voroshilov, and Gusev in the military 
debates of the early 1920's made way for the rise of a 
monolithic military doctrine that guides the Red Army to 
this day.16 That doctrine is based on the employment of 
combined arms and the doctrine of the offensive. 
The Great Patriotic War did not alter Soviet views on 
the nature of war nor did it inspire a revision of Soviet 
military doctrine. Instead, the experiences of the Great 
Patriotic War reinforced the lessons of the civil war for 
the Soviets and validated their military doctrine. Even 
the advent of nuclear weapons did not significantly alter 
the basic structure and interrelationships of 
"~dward Meade Earle, "Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin: Soviet 
Concepts of War," in: Makers of Modern Stratecry, ed. Edward 
Meade Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), 
322-323. Earle notes Lenin's marginal annotation of I1i.e., 
forcible meansw to the dictum. 
"D.F. White, The Growth of the Red Armv (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1944), 24-198, describes the civil 
war period and the ensuing military debates. 
Marxist-Leninist military theory, military doctrine, or 
military art and strategy. The Soviets were able to 
integrate nuclear weapons into their combined-arms doctrine 
and retain the offensive as the preferred method of 
warfare. 17 
A. SOVIET THOUGHT ON WAR AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Throughout the development of Soviet military theory, 
doctrine, and strategy the emphasis remained on the use of 
the greatest amount of force possible, based on the 
available military technology. While the Soviets pay lip 
service to the fact that new technology creates the need to 
develop new warfighting methods, the development of Soviet 
military doctrine indicates a tendency to change doctrine 
only in response to the most powerful technological 
"~ondoleezza Rice, "The Making of Soviet Strategy," in: 
Makers of Modern Strateqv, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), 674. This is not to say 
that the Soviets have been unres~onsive to technolosical 
change, Robin Lee Csuti, An ~xamination of the CuGrent 
Revolution in Soviet Militarv Affairs (Master's Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1988) outlines three "revolutions in 
Soviet military affairs." However, these revolutions were 
essentially changes in Soviet assessments of potential future 
wars and means of preparation for those wars based on 
technological advances. They occurred as experiential 
feedback within the framework of Soviet military theory, 
doctrine, and strategy, to be described below. A more 
fundamental change in Soviet military thought, inspired by 
nuclear weapons, may be occurring under Gorbachev. See, for 
example, Sergey Akhromeyev, "The Doctrine of Averting War and 
Defending Peace and Socialism," World Mamist Review 30, no. 
12 (December 1987): 37-47 and Michael McGwire, "Rethinking 
War: The Soviets and European Securitytrl Brookinqs Review 6, 
no. 2 (Spring 1988) : 3-12. 
developments and then only to the extent that the new 
technology can be made to fit the ever enduring doctrines of 
offensive and combined arms.'' The Soviets seem to be 
dragged to the high end of the conflict spectrum by 
technological advances. This, combined with the dominance 
of lessons learned in the Civil War and World War I1 seems 
to provide a partial answer to why problems of counterinsur- 
gency seem to have been almost completely absent from Soviet 
military thought up to 1979 in spite of several years of 
Soviet experience fighting internal insurgencies. 
B. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 
The Soviets have devised a comprehensive scientific 
approach to the problems of war. It is multileveled with, 
of course, Marxism-Leninism as the uppermost, all-defining 
level of thought. From this highest level is derived a 
theory of war and army which in turn directs development of 
Soviet military doctrine. Doctrine, which is the level at 
which the party and the military interact most on military 
matters, has two sides: the political (the purview of the 
party), and the scientific-technical (the purview of the 
military, guided by the party). Doctrine determines the 
''see V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Militarv Strateay, ed. 
Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 
1968): 25-33 and 260-303. 
development of Soviet military science which encompasses, 
among other things, strategy, operations, and tactics. 1s 
It is at the doctrinal level that theory is translated 
into practical reality. Marshal Grechko described Soviet 
military doctrine as answering the following basic 
questions: 
- What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war? 
- What is the nature of the war in which the state and 
its armed forces will have to take part; what goals and 
missions might they be faced with in this war? 
- What armed forces are needed to execute the assigned 
missions, and in what direction must military 
development be carried out? 
- How are preparations for war to be implemented? 
- What methods must be used to wage war?" I 
~ 
By 1963, when the first edition of Soviet Military 
i Stratesv was published the Soviets still had not I incorporated problems of counterinsurgency into their I military doctrine. There was still no counterinsurgency I doctrine developed by 1968 when the third edition was 
published. The deficiency was so glaring that the Rand 
editors of the first edition noted that: 
... no doctrine of local war is developed in the book 
itself. Neither does the book deal with guerrilla 
operations and other forms of irregular warfare...the 
''See S.N. Kozlov, ed., The Officer's Handbook: A Soviet 
w, trans. USAF (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1971): 39-66. 
"1n Graham Vernon, ed., Soviet Percevtions of War and 
Peace (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 
l98l), 6. 
authors...note that Soviet military strategy faces a 
serious task in working out ways and means to deal not 
with modern wars in general, but with the conditions that 
apply to "a given particular war.@ 
Since Soviet doctrine determines force structure and 
training, the best evidence of Soviet neglect of doctrinal 
problems of counterinsurgency lies in the structure and 
training of the Soviet armed forces. By 1979, when the 
Soviets invaded Afghanistan, their army was still almost 
exclusively organized and trained for large scale 
conventional operations (and conventional operations in a 
nuclear environment) against similar opposing forces in 
~urope.~~ The lack of training for counterinsurgency or even 
for operations in mountain warfare was immediately felt in 
Afghanistan and further demonstrates Soviet doctrinal 
inattention to counterinsurgency. 23 
C. THE ANATOMY OF COMMLTNIST TAKEOVERS AND SOVIET 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
This is not to say that a pattern or standard 
methodology of Soviet counterinsurgency has not emerged. As 
the following four case studies will demonstrate, a standard 
21 V.D. Sokolovskii, ed., Soviet Militarv Stratecrv, trans. 
Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Goure, and Thomas Wolfe (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963): 48-49. 
"~oseph Collins, 8fSoviet Militarv Performance in 
~fghanistaii: A preliminary Assessment,1s ~orn~arative Strateav 
4, no. 2 (1983): 161. 
23~lex Alexiev, Inside the Soviet Armv in Afahanistan 
(Santa Monica: Rand, May 1988, R-3627-A): 14-15, describes 
Soviet training deficiencies. 
Soviet approach to counterinsurgency did evolve and it will 
be argued in chapter six that this standard approach 
24 
amounted to a de facto doctrine. This de facto doctrine 
had as its prototype not a previous counterinsurgent 
campaign but the Bolshevik seizure and consolidation of 
power. Study of one seminal overview of the methodology of 
communist takeovers, The Anatomv of Communist Takeovers, 
makes clear the parallels between the Bolshevik seizure and 
consolidation of power and the Soviet approach to 
counterinsurgency. 25 In it, Thomas Hammond lists six basic 
elements of the Bolshevik seizure of power: the use of 
armed force, the use of propaganda, ruthlessness, the party, 
planning (of a cohesive approach by the Party), use of 
camouflage (of the Party's true intentions). 26 These 
methods and their sub-elements, such as purge of the 
population, collective responsibility, terror and 
repression, collectivization, and mass deportations, appear 
repeatedly in Soviet counterinsurgent campaigns just as they 
did during the Bolshevik revolution and the Stalin era. In 
24 The author uses doctrine in this case in the more 
general sense that it is used in the West, indicating a 
generally accepted methodology and encompassing strategy, 
operations, and tactics. The emergence of a de facto doctrine 
in this sense did not create a place for counterinsurgency 
within Soviet military thought in the Soviets' formalistic 
definition of doctrine. 
25~homas T. Hammond, ed., The Anatomv of Communist 
Takeovers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975). 
26~ammond, Anatomv of Communist Takeovers, 2-3. 
14 
effect, the methods of revolution became the weapons against 
counterrevolution. 
None of this, however, worked its way into established 
Soviet military thought. Instead it existed almost as an 
automatic or by rote response to insurgencies. Under the 
conditions of the first three cases examined, Turkestan, 
Lithuania, and the Ukraine, this was sufficient and 
apparently obviated for the Soviets any need to develop 
doctrine or training specific to counterinsurgency. In 
Afghanistan, where the old approach proved ineffective, the 
lack of a doctrine of counterinsurgency and a resulting 
program of counterinsurgency training was sorely felt. 
Chapter VI offers some reasons for why the Soviets succeeded 
in the earlier campaigns in spite of having no doctrinal 
preparation and yet failed in Afghanistan. 
111. SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENCY IN CENTRAL ASIA: 
THE- 
- 
One of the first challenges to Soviet power came in the 
form of an armed revolt in Russian Turkestan, a Central 
Asian province. The uprising against the Tashkent Soviet, 
and Turksovnarkom, the Soviet's committee on regional 
policy, quickly spread in early 1918 and became a prolonged 
resistance movement whose many parts became known 
collectively as the  asm ma chi.^' The Basmachi uprising 
continued after the lied Army broke through the White forces 
that had isolated Central Asia for nearly two years and 
established Turkkomi:;sia, the Turkestan Commission of the 
Russian Communist Party, in 1920 as the representative arm 
of the central government. The Basmachi, who had nearly 
destroyed the Tashkent Soviet, began to lose ground to the 
political measures of Turkkomissia and the effective 
Z7~illiam S. Ritter, "The Final Phase in the Liquidation 
of Anti-Soviet Resistance in Tadzhikistan: Ibrahim Bek and 
the Basmachi, 1924-1931,11 Soviet Studies 37, no. 4 (October 
1985): 491, identifies Basmachi as derived from the Turkish 
verb basmak, meaning "to oppress, to violate" and having been 
used before the Russian Revolution to name a variety of bandit 
groups that roamed the Central Asian countryside. After the 
revolution the term was used to describe the anti-Soviet 
guerrillas. This appears to have been a propaganda effort by 
the Soviets to brand the guerrillas as bandits but sources to 
be cited below demonstrate that the Soviets, although 
understandably reluctant to acknowledge it publicly, were 
aware of the national and religious motivations of the 
resistance. 
16 
military campaign of its Red Army regulars. Yet even under 
tremendous pressure the Basmachi uprising endured for three 
more years before widespread resistance ended. Even then, 
localized but vigorous resistance continued under Ibrahim 
Bek in eastern Bukhara and from bases in Afghanistan until 
1931. 
The Soviet struggle with the Basmachi passed through two 
phases. The first lasted from 13 December 1917, when the 
Union of Muslims announced the formation of the Kokand 
Autonomous Government in opposition to the Tashkent Soviet, 
until July 1920 when the Bolsheviks sent Turkkomissia to 
take over from the Tashkent So~iet.~' This period was 
characterized by oppressive political policies backed by 
ineffective military force, the combination of the two only 
serving to provoke increased resistance. 
The second phase began with the establishment of 
Turkkomissia as the central authority in Turkestan in 1920 
and lasted, in two segments, until 1931. The first segment 
of Turkkomissia's campaign against the Basmachi lasted until 
1924 when resistance on Soviet territory was essentially 
broken. The second segment lasted from 1924 until 1931 
while the Soviets forced Ibrahim Bek onto Afghan territory 
and wore him down to his final defeat in 1931. Turkkomissia 
'%artha B. Olcott, "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in 
Turkestan 1918-1924, Soviet Studies 33, no. 3 (July 1981) : 
354-357. 
reversed many of the political policies of the discredited 
Tashkent Soviet, which had alienated most of the native 
\ 
population. The political moderation and concessions of 
Turkkomissia were supported by forceful and effective 
military operations. The Soviet counterinsurgency campaign 
after 1920 succeeded in separating the Basmachi from their 
popular support and in reclaiming and organizing territory 
under Soviet control. These measures struck at the central 
elements which are recognized today as essential to the 
viability of an insurgent movement. 
I A. THE TASHKENT SOVIET AND THE BASMACHI 1917-1920 
Turkestan became part of the Russian Empire late in the 
nineteenth century and strong anti-Russian sentiment still 
existed among the natives by the time of the October 
Revolution. Major uprisings against Russian rule had taken 
place in 1898 and 1926.'' Yet it was not inevitable that a 
third major uprising would develop in the anarchic wake of 
the revolution in Petrograd and Moscow. At least one major 
segment of the Moslem intelligentsia in Turkestan, the Ulema 
Jemyeti, voted to support the Tashkent Soviet and could have 
been instrumental in preventing an armed clash. The 
Tashkent Soviet set .its self destructive course early, 
"see Michael Rywkin, ploscow~s Muslin Challenae: Soviet 
Central Asia (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1982): 1- 
20, on Tsarist penetration into Central Asia and subsequent 
unrest. 
however, by voting on 15 November 1917 to exclude all native 
Turkestanis since they I1were not organized on a proletarian 
basis. w30 
This short-sighted policy, instituted by a Soviet 
composed of eight Socialist Revolutionaries and seven 
Bolsheviks in the name of, but in isolation from the 
Bolshevik central government, was developed in a strongly 
colonialist atmosphere with the support of most of the 
31 Russian population of Turkestan. The minority Russians, 
isolated from European Russia and surrounded by a hostile 
population, apparently saw the issue in terms of survival or 
destruction with no room for compromise or conciliation. 32 
Marie Broxup describes this period as one of, "political 
intransigence and terror," in which, lfSurvival was the only 
goal and the only 
The foundation of what would become a counterproductive 
policy was reinforced by the precarious strategic position 
of the Tashkent Soviet and of all the Russians in Turkestan. 
The Soviets had only one rail line into Turkestan and it was 
30 Olcott, "The Basmachi or Freemen's Revolt in Turkestan 
1918-1924," 354. 
31 Marie Broxup, "The Basmachi, Central Asian Review 2, 
no. 1 (1983): 65-66. 
"E.H. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 2 (New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 1950), 330, gives the 1917 population 
of Turkestan as approximately 12 million, including 500,000 
Russian immigrants. 
3 3 ~ r o ~ ~ p ,  nThe Basmachi, " 65-66. 
cut in late 1917 by the Orenburg Cossacks under Dutov. The 
line remained cut, except for brief openings, for nearly two 
years. Famine and economic collapse resulted from the 
cessation of grain imports from Europe and exports of cotton 
and The cut rail communications were symptomatic of 
Turkestan's political and military isolation from the 
central government. Even if the line was open, the 
Bolsheviks were too hard pressed by the Whites to spare 
troops for Turkestan until well into 1919. These conditions 
must have hardened the anti-Moslem, neocolonialist outlook 
of the new Soviet government. 
These factors all became important when the exclusionary 
vote of the Tashkent Soviet galvanized the Moslem 
intelligentsia against the government. The once ambivalent 
Moslem factions on 13 December 1917 established the Kokand 
Autonomous Government in the Fergana Valley, demanding, 
'Iautonomy within the Russian state with full national 
representation and self-rule for Turkestan.~~~~ The two 
governments competed for recognition from Moscow but, when 
the White blockade of the rail line at Orenburg was 
temporarily broken in January 1918, Moscow sent weapons and 
supplies to Tashkent. Resupplied Red Guard detachments from 
3 4 ~ . ~ .  Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, vol. 2, 331. 
35w~he Basmachis. The Central Asian Resistance Movement 
1918-1924," Central Asian Review, 7, no. 3 (1959), 236, and 
Olcott, "The Basmachi," 354. 
Tashkent attacked Kokand and sacked the city. The ensuing 
massacre is estimated to have cost the lives of 14,000 to 
50,000 Moslem inhabitants of K~kand.~~ This revived the 
spirit of resistance that had flared-up in 1898 and 1916. 
Raids against Russian settlements and garrisons in Fergana 
developed into a resistance movement which eventually spread 
to Bukhara, the Lokay and Khiva regions, and Northern 
~fghanistan.~~ The policies and actions of Turksovnarkom had 
turned a surly and resentful but relatively quiescent 
populace into an active threat to Soviet rule in Central 
Asia. 
1. Political Measures of Turksovnarkom~s Counterinsur- 
aencv CamDair~n 
The political and military measures used by 
Turksovnarkom to try to control Turkestan, as described by 
Marie Broxup, were embodied in the phrase: I8Strike before 
you are This kind of aggressiveness has a 
place, along with a balanced political approach, in 
counterinsurgency. But Turksovnarkom adopted this policy in 
3601~ott, IlThe Basmachi,l1 354-355 and Broxup, "The 
Ba~rnachi,~ 59. 
37~he first four being the distinct geographic locations 
of the separate elements of the movement labeled as a whole as 
the "Basmachi, as identified by Broxup, "The Basmachi, 59. 
See Ritter, "The Final Phase in the Liquidation of Anti-Soviet 
Resistance in Tadzhikistan: Ibrahim Bek and the Basmachi, 
1924-31," 484-493, on the period of Basmachi operations in 
Afghanistan. 
38~roxup, "The Basmachi, 66. 
spirit and practice immediately after coming to power and 
before any native uprising was evident. The alienative 
measures that sprang from this mentality inspired the 
formation of the Kokand Autonomous Government (K.A.G.) and 
fueled the resistance after the violent destruction of the 
K.A.G. 
The Tashkent Soviet, by early December 1917, had 
declared the shariat (Koranic law) invalid, destroyed 
religious foundation:: and law-courts in Turkestan, and 
nationalized all land, including waqf lands (land owned by 
39 the clergy). These measures were apparently, along with 
the earlier ruling excluding Moslems from the Soviet, an 
effort to decapitate the non-proletarian Moslem society in 
I Turkestan and exert Soviet control. 
However, rather than preventing resistance to Soviet 
rule, the new measures created it by transforming the Moslem 
perception of the Russian presence in Turkestan from 
resented colonialists to a revolutionary threat to their 
religious, political, social, and economic way of life. 40 
The creation of the K.A.G. was the first manifestation of 
resistance to this threat. The armed uprising that followed 
3901cott, "The Basmachi, 342 and ##The Basmachi, " central 
Asian Review, 236. 
4001~ott, llThe Dasrna~hi,~~ 352-353 contrasts the Tsarist 
colonialists policies that left Moslem society in Turkestan 
mostly unchanged with the revolutionary policies that the 
Tashkent Soviet tried to implement immediately. 
the destruction of the K.A.G was further expression of 
resistance to the national discrimination and oppression of 
the Tashkent Soviet." The confiscation of the Fergana 
cotton crop after the sacking of Kokand increased the 
economic hardship of the populace and fueled Moslem anger 
against the new Russian rulers. The combination of all 
these events and policies had a quick effect; by April 1918 
Basmachi groups had formed in every town in Fergana. These 
independent groups began a campaign of arson, murder, and 
surprise attacks which reduced Soviet control to the main 
towns in Fergana and the railway. 42 
Basmachi pressure was so great that eventually the 
Tashkent Soviet was forced to consider political compromise 
43 with the rebels. These half-hearted efforts to attract 
Moslem support met with no success, largely because the 
Soviet military conbinued to commit atrocities in the name 
of restoring order. On one hand, these operations 
undermined Turksovnarkom*s political efforts by inspiring 
increased resentment. On the other hand, the operations, 
although repressive, were ineffective and did not discourage 
the Basmachi. 
4101~~tt, "The Basmachi, *I 352 and "The Basmachis, Central 
Asian Review, 236. 
421*~he Basmachis, Central Asian Review, 237. 
43  Broxup, "The Basmachi," 68. 
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The political policies of the Tashkent Soviet were 
so unsuccessful that in January 1919 its commissar for war 
attempted a coup. When the coup failed, the conspirators 
briefly joined one of the major Basmachi leaders. Another 
segment of the Russian minority alienated by the Soviet was 
the "Russian Peasant Army," a peasant militia armed by the 
Soviets which, disgruntled with War Communism, allied itself 
with the Basmachi in the summer of 1919. This Basmachi- 
Russian alliance organized a second opposition government in 
September 1919, the Provisional Government of Fergana, and 
sought cooperation with other anti-Bolshevik groups as well 
as aid from Afghanistan." The Tashkent Soviet was so inept 
that by mid-1919 it had inspired the formation of a growing 
anti-Soviet Moslem-Russian front which eventually gained 
control of most of the Fergana Valley. In spite of the 
disorganization and occasional open hostility between the 
Basmachi factions, the Soviet appeared near defeat and it 
seems unlikely that it could have survived much longer had 
the forces of the central government not reached Turkestan 
in late 1919. 
2. Militam Measures of Turkesovnarkomls Counterinsur- 
gencv Cam~aiqn 
The Tashkent Soviet's military campaign against the 
Basmachi was limited by two factors: strategic isolation 
from possible reinforcements and resupply from the central 
44 
"The Basmachis,I1 Central Asian Review, 238. 
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government, and limited military forces in Turkestan itself. 
This situation seemed to dictate a defensive posture. 
However, the aggressive political programs of the Soviet and 
their stimulation of the resistance demanded an offensive 
military strategy. The result was a strategy with a dual 
nature that fit neither the demands of the political 
situation nor the reality of the strategic situation. 
The Tashkent Soviet had approximately 21,215 troops 
available to fight the Basmachi by mid-1919. The Basmachi 
numbered between 10,000-30,000 during the same period. l5 
Besides limited numbers, the Soviet troops were constrained 
by widely varying capabilities, some quite limited, and 
problems of interoperability between the disparate forces. 
The Soviet forces were made up of regular Red Army units (11 
regiments of infantry and cavalry), some small 
pre-revolutionary units, one Tatar regiment, Red Guard units 
made up of Russian peasant, Russian worker's militia, some 
minority units and some Muslim units that often switched 
allegiances. Some international regiments manned by German 
and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war were the most 
effective fighting units but must have further complicated 
the command and control problems of this patchwork army. 46 
45~ee Broxup, "The Basmachi," 60 and 67, for estimates of 
Soviet troop strength and numbers of Basmachi. See also 
Olcott, "The Basmachi," 355 for numbers of Basmachi in 1919. 
46 Broxup, "The Basmachi," 67. 
25 
The offensive efforts of the anti-Basmachi forces 
were characterized by large-scale operations aimed at 
forcing the Basmachi to fight in the open. The highly 
mobile Basmachi avoided decisive confrontation with large 
forces. Perhaps out of frustration, the Soviet forces began 
to shoot peasants suspected of collaborating with the 
rebels. These methods, along with cavalry raids on 
villages, looting by the poorly disciplined troops, 
burdensome requisitioning, and various atrocities 
constituted the offensive against the Basmachi. Quite 
understandably, they failed to cause substantial harm to the 
Basmachi but helped their cause by further alienating the 
populace from the regime. 4 7  
Political desire for an offensive strategy could not 
overcome the limitations of the Soviet forces and so they 
were forced mostly to pursue a defensive strategy. The main 
effort was to preserve control of the rail line, the major 
towns and Tashkent. But the small, inefficient Soviet force 
could not withstand the rebel pressure generated by the 
political ineptitude of Turksovnarkom. The Soviets 
gradually lost control of most of the territory of the 
Fergana Valley and then, in succession, the towns of eastern 
and southeastern Fergana. Even a major portion of the rail 
line in eastern Fergana fell into Basmachi hands and was 
47 Broxup, "The Basmachi, 66-69, and Rywkin, Moscow's 
pluslim Challense, 34-35. 
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destroyed. The Soviet forces, concentrating on defense of 
the cities and pursuit of the Basmachi forces, made no 
effort to occupy territory and organize it against the 
rebels. 48 
By late 1919 the Tashkent Soviet had nearly brought 
about its own destruction. It had failed politically and 
militarily against the Basmachi and the Red Army 
reinforcements sent in September must have been meant more 
to save ~01she;ik power in Turkestan rather than to rescue 
the thoroughly discredited Tashkent Soviet. 4s 
B. TURKKOMISSIA AND THE BASMACHI 1920-1924 
By mid-year in 1919 the central government was confident 
enough to turn its attention to the Turkestan problem. The 
renewed Bolshevik interest became evident when the Party 
Central Committee began to try to steer the Tashkent Soviet 
via telegrams starting in ~uly." Also in July, the 
government for the first time dispatched significant forces 
48tl~he Basmachi, " Central Asian Review, 237-238, Olcott, 
"The Basmachi," 355-357, and Broxup, "The BasmachiItt 67-68. 
49~he deep dissatisfaction of the central government with 
the Tashkent Soviet is evident in Carr, The Bolshevik 
Revolution, 333-335. Also, G. Safarov, Bolonia18naia 
Revolutsia-Ow Turkestann (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1921): quoted in 
Broxup, "The Basmachi," 66; describes the members of the 
Tashkent Soviet as, "adventurers, careerists and plain 
criminal elements...who were determined by all means, to 
preserve and extend the privileges enjoyed by the Russian 
proletariat in Turkestan.l8 
50~arr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 334. 
to reclaim Turkestan. White forces remained a threat, 
however, and Frunzels Fifth Army did not reach Tashkent 
until mid-1920 but the Soviet Combined Kazan Regiment under 
the command of A.P. Sokolov was able to reach Tashkent 
before Frunze." In September 1919 Sokolovts forces restored 
communications between Moscow and Turkestan and fresh troops 
began to reclaim Fergana. Osh and Dzhalal-Abad, two major 
towns in eastern Fergana were retaken by the end of the 
month. 52 . 
The reassertion of central political authority quickly 
followed the new infusion of military power. The Central 
Committee sent the new Turkestan Commission (Turkkomissia) 
to Tashkent in October. It is clear that Turkkomissia took 
control of the situation immediately although it coexisted 
with the Tashkent Soviet from October 1919 to July 1920. 
The complete reversal of the Soviet's political decisions, 
immediate military gains and quick deterioration of the 
Basmachits position confirms Turkkomissials dominance during 
this period. The rapid turnaround of the situation also 
sealed the fate of the discredited Tashkent Soviet. In July 
Moscow directed that that maladroit body be disbanded and 
51 Joseph L. Wieczynski, ed., The Modern Encvclovedia of 
-y, vol. 3 (Gulf Breeze, Florida: 
Academic International Press, 1977), s.v., tt~asmachi RevoltIt1 
by Fred R. Belk. 
5211~he Basmachi, Central Asian Review, 238 ; and Olcott, 
"The Basmachi, I' 356-357. 
replaced with a Provisional Central Committee that included 
Turkestani natives. 53 
1. Turkkomissiass Political Measures 
Turkkomissia replaced the narrow colonialist 
interests of Turksovnarkom with the grander Soviet goal of 
retention of Russian empire. This allowed the ineffective 
measures of the fearful colonialists to be replaced with the 
more sophisticated and far sighted programs of the 
revolutionaries representing the central government. The 
political half of the Bolshevik campaign against the 
Basmachi therefore took on an entirely new complexion after 
1919: the provocative political intransigence of 
Turksovnarkom was abandoned in favor of expedient 
concessions. 
Turkkomissia recognized the necessity for political, 
as well as military, defeat of the rebels.54 The commission 
therefore began immediately to improve the image of Soviet 
power in Turkestan. The most chauvinistic elements of 
Russian power were ousted and replaced with more 
winternationalist" minded minority members from Moscow. 55 
Communist Party membership was opened to native Moslems, 
even those who were merely sympathetic to Party goals but 
5301~ott, "The Basmachi, 357. 
54 Olcott, "The Basmachi," 357. 
55~roxup, "The Basmachi, 66. 
2 9 
not necessarily devout communists. The new approach of 
winning over the natives instead of crushing them became 
evident in January 1920 when, "the first 'Red traint left 
Moscow for Turkestan with a full complement of propagandists 
and literature in the local languages.s156 The Bolsheviks 
also deployed a brigade of Tatars in Fergana aimed at 
winning over their co-religionists through propaganda, if 
possible, instead of military action. 57 
The commission also worked to relieve the conditions 
of 'famine and economic dislocation that had developed during 
the civil war and which fueled the rebellion. Grain 
shipments and economic assistance to Turkestan were started 
and food was once again distributed equitably between 
Russians and natives. The reopened bazaars and the renewal 
of legalized private trading also helped to improve 
conditions and undermine the Basmachi cause. These economic 
measures were strengthened and their political worth 
increased by the initiation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
in March 1921. Land reform and a decreased tax burden 
followed in the wake of NEP liberalizati~n.~' The cumulative 
effect of these disparate measures was to cause the native 
%arr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 335. 
 he Basmachi, Central Asian Review, 239. 
''see Olcott , "The Basmachi, *I 357 and "The Basmachi, It 
Central Asian Review, 239. 
population, "genuinely to believe that the era of terror of 
Turksovnarkom was over. 
Turksovnarkom was cast further into the shadows by 
the almost immediate success of Turkkomissials new policies. 
By mid-January 1920 the Russian Peasant A m y  had negotiated 
a truce with the Soviet forces and abandoned the Basmachi 
cause. During January and February Basmachi surrendered in 
groups as large as 3000. In a model of effective 
political-military cooperation against insurgents, the Red 
Army forces in Fergana had bided their time in defensive 
operations while political and economic measures whittled 
away Basmachi support and strength. Then, after the 
Basmachi bad been divided and weakened, the army attacked 
the main remaining force and defeated it. The result was 
that all but one Basmachi leader surrendered during b arch.^' 
Turkkomissia did not end all unpopular measures, 
however, and labor and military conscription continued in 
Fergana. Requisitions of food and property also continued 
to fuel unrest. Conditions were therefore right for a 
flare-up of Basmachi activity when the Soviets attacked 
Bukhara in September 1920 and installed a Young Bukharan 
Government in place of the deposed ~mir.~' The Basmachi 
5 8 ~ r o ~ ~ p ,  The Basmachi, 70. 
6"1~he Basmachi, " Central Asian Review, 239. 
61n~he Basmachi, Central Asian Review, 240. 
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uprising was reinvigorated in Fergana and spread to Eastern 
Bukhara as a result of the Soviet attack. 
The Soviets answered the renewed challenge with a 
combination of new political measures and increased military 
pressure. Beginning in August 1921 amnesty and homesteads 
were offered to Basmachi who surrendered and the Bolshevik 
image as a direct threat to Islam was softened by restoring 
Sharipa law in October 1921.62 In addition to making 
concessions on Islam, Turkkomissia circulated propaganda 
aimed at discrediting the religious leadership as, 
"reactionary and unreliable." The result was that some 
religious leaders were won over by Soviet concessions while 
others were alienated from the populace by propaganda. One 
writer describes the effect of this astute, low cost 
campaign : 
... the coopting of Muslim clergy and the use by the 
Bolshevik government of outside Muslim troops against 
local Muslims struck a severe psychological blow to the 
Basmachis. This factor lessened Islam as a driving force 
and ultimately led to a loss of spirit among the 
resistance together with a depletion of support in the 
countryside. 63 
These measures and the arrival of two more Soviet 
divisions in September created a bleak outlook for the 
rebels. Yet the Basmachi cause was revitalized once again, 
6Z~1~ott, nThe Basmachi, 357. 
63~den Naby, "The .'concept of Jihad in Opposition to 
Communist Rule: Turkestan and Afghanistan," Studies in 
Com~arative Communism 19, no. 3/4 (Autumn/Winter 1986), 292- 
293. 
this time by the arrival in Bukhara in November 1921 of the 
dynamic Pan Turkic leader, Enver Pasha. 
Between November 1921 and August 1922 Enver expanded 
the Basmachi forces in Bukhara, reformed their command 
structure, established cooperation and supply routes 
between Basmachi factions in Fergana and Bukhara, and 
regularized Basmachi contact with supporters in Afghanistan. 
His forces were able to turn the tide in early 1922 and 
regain control of most of the countryside of Eastern and 
Western Bukhara. 
The Basmachi resurgence was short-lived, however, in 
the face of the Bolshevik response. Major concessions 
regarding waqf lands, Shari'a courts, legalization of Koran 
schools, and programs indicating general Bolshevik tolerance 
of Islam were instituted in May 1922 in response to Enverls 
successes. Amnesty offers were renewed, this time with 
guarantees of limited tribal auton~my.~-hese programs 
eroded popular support for the Basmachis while a strong Red 
Army offensive pushed Enverls forces out of Eastern Bukhara, 
recapturing one town after another and isolating him from 
the populace. By July, Soviet pressure on Kabul forced the 
recall to Afghanistan of the Afghan volunteers who had 
supplemented Enverls forces. Finally, on 4 August, Enver 
6401~ott, nThe Basmachi, 358-360. 
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Pasha was killed in battle with Red Army forces in Eastern 
Bukhara . 65 
Heavy military pressure gradually forced the 
remaining Basmachi out of Bukhara and Fergana where 
effective resistance was crushed by early 1923. Resistance 
in Bukhara lasted until the end of 1924 when nothing but 
insignificant, scattered bands of rebels were all that 
remained. The smaller areas of Basmachi activity in the 
Khiva and Lokay regions were also brought under Soviet 
control by the end of 1924. Those Basmachi leaders who were 
not captured or killed fled to Afghanistan. One such 
leader, Ibrahim Bek, continued to launch attacks from 
Afghanistan against Soviet rule in Turkestan until he was 
finally captured and executed in 1931.~~ But by 1924 the 
Moslem threat to Soviet rule in Central Asia was defeated. 
The Soviets ensured that the sporadic acts of 
resistance that continued to occur did not develop into a 
second general uprising by enacting the 8tcantonizationM of 
Central Asia. The region was politically and 
administratively fragmented by subdivision into republics 
658t~he Basmachi, It Central Asian Review, 245. 
%ee William S. Ritter, "The Final Phase in the 
Licruidation of Anti-Soviet Resistance in Tadzhikistan: 
1brahim Bek and the Basmachi, 1924-193lIt1 Soviet Studies 37, 
no. 4 (October 1985) : 484-493. 
and ethnic states. '' Then, having raised sufficient barriers 
to cohesion between the various Moslem groups, the 
Bolsheviks returned to the anti-Islam policies which 
7 Turksovnarkom had begun. In 1925 the central government 
began a program of sovietization in Central Asia that 
- 
included the gradual withdrawal of the various concessions 
and expedient measures taken during the uprising. Waqf 
lands were seized again, shari'a courts closed, and, by 
1929, Koran schools were banned.68 
2. The Military Aspect of Turkkomissia's Anti-Basmachi 
Cam~aian 
Under Turkkomissia, the pattern of misguided, 
ineffective military action was reversed and the tide of 
gradual Basmachi encroachment was turned. The new 
representatives of the central government, unlike their 
- 
predecessors on Turksovnarkom, recognized the necessity for 
coordinated political and military action against the 
rebels. These ideas were shared by the Red Army commanders 
sent to conduct operations against the Basmachi. Writing in 
1926, Marshal Tukhachevsky, who commanded the 1st Army of 
Frunze's Turkestan Front against the Basmachi, expressed the 
views held by those who had controlled military operations 
67~ee Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic 
Threat to the Soviet State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1983), 41-44; and Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire (St. Martin's 
Press, 1967), 143-149. 
6801~ott, "The Basmachi, 361. 
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in Central Asia at the start of the Basmachi uprising: 
To liquidate a peasant uprising, there is a need, besides 
military actions, for a broad political campaign to 
explain the peasant's true interests .... Military actions 
should be closely combined with political and economic 
measures and be accompanied by an explanation as to why 
such measures are employed in the interests of unity 
between workers and peasants....From the national point of 
view, banditry, or the Basmachi movement, becomes even 
more complicated because of the necessity of outlining and 
putting into practice a correct national policy ... the 
Soviet power has to reckon not only with the national but 
also with the religious composition of the local 
population. 69 
This represented a convergence of political and 
military opinions on how to defeat the Basmachi that is 
almost unique (at least all too rare) in the history of 
counterinsurgency. The political leadership was 
sufficiently ruthless and aware of military capabilities and 
the military leadership was politically sophisticated enough 
for the two to find a common ground in the anti-Basmachi 
struggle. Osipov's attempted coup illustrates 
Turksovnarkom~s failure along these lines. The result was 
that once the military threats to Bolshevik power in Central 
Europe were eliminated, the Basmachi faced an enemy with 
unified political-military goals and sufficient military 
power to achieve them. 
The increase in Soviet military power after late 
1919 was tremendous, adding 110,000, "well-trained, 
%ikhail Tukhachevsky , "The Struggle Against Banditry, 'I 
in: The Guerrilla Reader, ed. Walter LaQuer (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1977), 180-182. 
well-armed, disciplined veterans under the command of the 
best Soviet military leaders," to the 20,000-30,000 
Turksovnarkom troops. Frunzets Turkestan Front was 
7 organized into two armies, the 4th and the lst, as well as 
special Cheka units, and was equipped with 929 machineguns 
. 
and 99 field guns. Armored cars, armored trains and 
aircraft added to Red Army striking power. During this time 
the rebels numbered no more than 20,000 men, divided among 
several fragmented and often isolated groups. 70 And while 
Basmachi troop losses were not easily replaced, the 
Bolsheviks had no lack of military manpower with which to 
reinforce the Turkestan Front. On 1 October 1920 the Red 
Army had 5,498,000 mobilized troops. As European threats to 
Soviet power faded, these forces were gradually demobilized 
but by 1 October 1924 the Red Army still numbered 529,865. 71 
Although the political and military leadership of 
Turkkomissia expressed a preference to win over the 
population by propaganda, the Bolsheviks were willing to use 
overwhelming force against those who resisted. Marshal 
70 In the earliest example of the Soviet's heavy reliance 
on firepower and the latest technology, even against under- 
equipped, untrained guerrillas, Frunzels anti-guerrilla 
forces, "pioneered in the employment of both airborne troops 
and aircraft to suppress poorly armed native forcesI1* during 
the Basmachi uprising. See Aleksander N. Lapchinskiy, "The 
Organization and Use of Airborne Landing Parties,*# in: 
Soviet Art of War, ed. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 64-65. See Broxup, "The 
Basmachi," 68-69 for Turkestan Front force composition. 
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Tukhachevskyns writings on the campaign against the Basmachi 
betray the ruthlessness of the Bolsheviks in crushing the 
rebellion: 
While an uprising in a city can easily be liquidated 
through a speedy concentration of the necessary forces and 
means, and while all the superiority of contemporary 
military technology can be put to use there, in the 
village this frequently proves to no avail. The air force 
does not see a thing apart from peasants working in the 
field; the artillery has no target to fire at, etc. 72 
For Tukhachevsky, counterinsurgent warfare was 
challenging not because it was difficult to sort out 
combatants from non-combatants (a constant dilemma for 
Western counterinsurgency forces) but because the enemy was 
too scattered for aircraft and artillery to target them--as 
opposed to a general uprising in a city, which one can 
simply level. This statement on the problems of fighting 
the Basmachi highlights two other points--once again, the 
Soviet emphasis on technology and maximum firepower. 
Secondly, it demonstrates that Turksovnarkom was discredited 
not for its campaign of terror against the Muslims but 
because, by miscalculating the correlation of forces, it 
failed in its terror campaign and almost lost Soviet control 
of Central Asia as a consequence. Taken together, it all 
serves to illustrate that although the Bolsheviks made 
whatever political concessions they felt necessary, they 
persuaded with a chain mail fist, not a kid glove. The 
nature of the military campaign against the Basmachi 
therefore had two sides: close integration with the 
propaganda programs and political maneuvers of the political 
leadership on the one hand, and on the other hand, ruthless 
use of overwhelming force in support of the same political 
programs or in their stead when they failed. 
While the Turksovnarkom forces had attempted to 
engage the elusive Basmachi in battle but made no effort to 
occupy and organize reclaimed territory, FrunzePs Turkestan 
Front concentrated on occupying territory and organizing 
native militias and party cadres to defend it against the 
rebels. The Bolsheviks also recognized that the Basmachi 
would have to be cutoff from their supporters in 
Afghanistan. The Red Army forces therefore concentrated on 
closing the Afghan border to rebel activity until 1922 when 
military and diplomatic pressure forced a withdrawal of 
Afghan support. 73 
The writings of Marshal Tukhachevsky describe the 
methods used to separate the Basmachi from their popular 
support. In addition to organizing reclaimed territory, the 
Bolsheviks used a system of "large-scale repression and 
... incentives." Collective responsibility, a Bolshevik 
standby for crushing resistance, was also used against 
Basmachi sympathizers and supporters, i.e., whole families 
7 3 ~ r ~ ~ ~ p ,  "The Basmachi, 69. 
39 
could be punished for the misdeeds of one member. According 
to Tukhachevsky, the reorganization of territories laid the 
ground work for the %ampaign of extirpation." Once an 
intelligence network had been established and identified 
Basmachi supporters, sympathizers, and family members, 
Tukhachevsky wrote that Isthe purge of the population will 
take place in complete congruence with the action of the Red 
Army. "74 The "purge of the populationtt , another oft-used 
Soviet method for defeating resistance, could be 
accomplished through a variety of means including 
imprisonment, execution, starvation of the countryside to 
force emigration or migration to Soviet controlled cities, 
or military pressure to force the same. 75 
The Bolsheviks assigned the dual role of occupation 
army and counterinsurgent force to the Turkestan ~ront . 76 
74 Tukhachevsky, "Banditry, 11 184, 
75~ee "The Basmachi," Central Asian Review, 246 for an 
example of Soviet use of food as a weapon against the rebels. 
Michael Rywkin, M m  
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 1982): 42-43 writes that 
200,000 inhabitants of Tadzhikistan, the center of the 
Basmachi resistance, had fled to Afghanistan by 1925, leaving 
two-thirds of the arable land fallow. The conflict in 
Uzbekistan left one quarter of the arable land abandoned. 
Broxup, "The Basmachi," 70-71, estimates that as many as one 
million refugees left for Afghanistan. The same policy would 
be taken to a devastating extreme in AFghanistan where 
6,000,000 Afghanis would be forced by the war into refugee 
camps in Iran and Pakistan. 
76~n "The Struggle Against Banditry, 183, Marshal 
Tukhachevsky wrote that "armed forces act in two ways: first 
by carrying out tasks of an army of occupation stationed in 
garrisons in order to safeguard the corresponding 
administrative Soviet bodies and their work; secondly, as a 
This was a more reasoned approach than the non-strategy of 
constant pursuit of the Basmachi used by the undermanned 
Tashkent Soviet and, once the occupation programs divided 
and weakened the Basmachi, it allowed the Turkkomissia 
forces to attack with overwhelming superiority. During the 
Turkkomissia phase of the conflict battles with force ratios 
of ten to one and even 17 to one favoring the Red Army were 
recorded." Enver Pasha was reputed to have been killed 
raiding force against the active bands. This approach, 
securing the base before taking the offensive, is more 
compatible with the conservative Soviet style of war and 
appears in each Soviet counterinsurgent campaign. Apparently 
the soviets had forgotten many of the lessons of the struggle 
against the Basmachi by the time they invaded Afghanistan but 
after a period of adjustment many of the lessons of Central 
Asia were applied to the new war, including a dual approach 
(occupation and counterinsurqencv) to the anti-Muiahidin 
campaign as described by Alex Alexiev, Inside the Soviet Armv 
in Afahanistan (Santa Monica: Rand, May 1988, R-3627-A): 20- 
34. Yet. as noted below. the Soviets were never as effective 
- 
in the ~bunterinsur~ent role in dfghani&an as-they had been 
in Turkestan. Broxup, "The Basmachi," 70, suggests that the 
8trevolutionary enthusiasmng of the Red Army troops of the 
1920's gave them an edge that the Soviet troops in Afghanistan 
did not have. 
7 7 ~ r o ~ ~ p ,  "The Basmachi, " 69. Alexiev, Inside the Soviet 
Armv in Afahanistan, notes that in Afghanistan, the "Soviet 
command seems to have become especially sensitive to losses,18 
and made "efforts to keep casualties at a minimum.. .such 
historically atypical behavior would indicate that there are 
at least some political constraints, real or perceived, that 
affect the Soviet army's operational decisionmaking in 
Afghanistan at present." However, the conservative approach 
and preoccupation with overwhelming force ratios that the 
Bolsheviks displayed in Turkestan suggest that Soviet 
sensitivity to losses in Afghanistan was only "historically 
atypicalv in relation to Soviet style in conventional warfare 
as, exemplified by World War 11, and may be g%ypica18t Soviet 
- style in some counterinsurgent wars. 
along with his entire group of 25 other Basmachi in a battle 
with 300 Red Army troops. 78 
C. THE MEANING OF SOVIET VICTORY IN CENTRAL ASIA 
The Basmachi cause which nearly defeated Turksovnarkom 
during 1918-1919 appears, in retrospect, to have been 
hopeless after late 1919. The inability of the Basmachi to 
develop a unified front allowed the Bolsheviks to capture 
the political issues of the conflict and to defeat 
militarily the rebel groups in detail. The party was a 
wedge driven between the Basmachi and the people and the Red 
Army drove the wedge in firmly, crushing the Basmachi in the 
process. Still, the resilience of the Basmachi through six 
years of war with a powerful enemy (13 years, if the 
sporadic attacks between 1924 and 1931 by Basmachi based in 
Afghanistan are counted) is as interesting as the reasons 
for their ultimate defeat." Yet the main lesson that the 
Soviets seem to have taken away from their victory over the 
Basmachi was "that a Muslim guerrilla war is not a dangerous 
one and can easily be won.v80 
-- - 
7881~he Basmachi, Central Asian Review, 245-246. 
'%artha Olcott, "The Basmachi, tends to focus on the 
endurance of the resistance movement in spite of their 
ultimate defeat while Broxup, "The Basmachi," pays more 
attention to Soviet success. 
"~roxup, "The Basmachi, 71. 
Several facts support this point. Most evident is the 
fact, described above, that the Soviets had not incorporated 
counterinsurgent warfare into their theory or doctrine of 
war by the time they invaded Afghanistan. Even the 
historical lessons of the Basmachi uprising had grown 
obscure to the Soviets by 1979." The early mistakes and the 
length of the conflict were apparently forgotten in the 
flush of the final, crushing victory. Ironically, the party 
that places so much stock in its "scientific approachw to 
history consigned the costly lessons of the struggle with 
the Basmachi to the "dustbin of historyu until necessity 
forced their retrieval 60 years later. 
''~lexander Bennisen, The Soviet Union and Muslim 
Guerrilla Wars, 1920-1921 (Santa Monica: Rand, August 1981, N- 
1707/1, 1-4, argues that, by 1981, the Soviets had not applied 
any of the lessons of the Basmachi uprising to their situation 
in Afghanistan. 
IV. S S  
In 1944, as the Red Amy pushed the'Germans westward, 
the Soviets were faced with the task of reasserting control 
over the western borderlands. This proved to be especially 
difficult in the Ukraine and in Lithuania where smoldering 
nationalism had erupted into anti-Soviet uprisings during 
the German invasion and had evolved into armed resistance 
movements. In both cases, the Germans, who had at first 
been looked upon as liberators, dashed hopes for 
independence and thereafter suffered from anti-occupation 
nationalist campaigns. 
Upon reclaiming the territories, the Soviets therefore 
faced well developed resistance movements in the Ukraine and 
the Baltic which looked upon the Red Army, as they had the 
Germans, as an occupation force. Even while the Germans 
still occupied their land the Lithuanians and Ukrainians did 
not welcome Soviet partisans as fellow collaborators against 
the Nazis." Instead, they were correctly perceived as the 
8ZSoviet leaders had ordered the formation of anti-German 
partisan units in the first desperate days after the German 
invasion. Khrushchev, then head of the Ukrainian Communist 
Party, gave detailed instructions on partisan organization to 
provincial party chiefs in late June, 1941. In a radio 
address to the Russian people in early July, Stalin ordered 
that guerrilla units be formed to harass the advancing 
Germans. As the war progressed, the Soviet partisan units 
were placed under the command of the Central Staff of the 
Partisan Movement with NKVD and army group and army level 
partisan sections as the intermediate command levels. 
advance guard of the Soviet oppressors. As a result, the 
Soviet partisans received little or no help in Lithuania 
where the resistance concentrated mostly on political 
agitation of non-cooperation with the Germans. In the 
Western Ukraine, where the resistance movement was using 
guerrilla warfare as well as political measures against the 
Germans, the Soviet partisans were attacked by Ukrainian 
insurgents. 
Although they had similar origins, occurred at the same 
time, and shared the common goal of national independence, 
it is important to note that the uprisings in Lithuania and 
in the West Ukraine were separate insurgencies. Lithuania 
and the Ukraine are ethnically distinct from each other and 
from Russia, they have separate histories, different 
languages and dissimilar cultures. Their territories are 
not contiguous. Although their resistance movements shared 
similar goals and developed tenuous contact, this never 
resulted in coordinated activities or any perceptible 
benefit to either the Lithuanian or Ukrainian insurgents. 
These distinctions are blurred, however, by the fact that 
the Soviets apparently saw no difference between the two 
national uprisings and used nearly identical methods in 
defeating them. The Soviets did not adapt their policies to 
Specially trained liaison teams were dispatched by Moscow to 
ensure Soviet control of the partisans. Robert B. Asprey, War 
in the Shadows (New York: ~oubleday and Company, ~nc;, i975): 
443-447 and 458-461. 
the different regions and, in fact, often implemented 
elements of their pacification programs, such as 
de-kulakization and mass deportations, simultaneously in 
Lithuania and the West Ukraine. 83 
This makes it useful and convenient to consider the 
separate insurgencies together especially since they share 
parallel histories after 1944. But this is not just a 
convenient device; it illustrates that under certain 
conditions the Soviets will forego efforts to respond to 
national distinctions (e.g., consideration of cultural and 
religious factors in the campaign against the Basmachi) and 
will apply blunt, generic methods in destroying an 
insurgency. Yet a pattern of Soviet counterinsurgency 
begins to emerge when other elements of their campaigns in 
Lithuania and the Ukraine are considered. Similarities with 
the Basmachi campaign such as development of a party 
apparatus, use of propaganda, collectivization, terror, and 
application of force are some of the elements that reappear 
in the post-WW I1 campaigns. 
A. SOVIET POLITICAL METHODS IN LITHUANIA AND THE 
UKRAINE 
Upon their return to Lithuania and the Western Ukraine 
the Soviets faced opposition from organized nationalist 
83~estutis Girnius, "Collectivization of Lithuanian 
Agriculture, 1944-1950,18 Soviet Studies 40, no. 3 (July 1988), 
461. 
46 
movements with bitter memories of Soviet occupation. 
Although the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had existed 
since 1923, the territories of the Western Ukraine had been 
a part of Poland until the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact 
permitted annexation by the Soviets in 1939.'~ The Soviet 
crackdown on Ukrainian political parties and the NKVD 
execution of as many as 10,000 political prisoners at the 
time of the Red Army's retreat in 1941 resulted in the 
formation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists 
(OUN) under Stepan Bandera and ensured West Ukrainian 
hostility towards the returning Soviets. 85 
The Lithuanian experience was made even more bitter 
since they had enjoyed 20 years of independence before the 
Soviet invasion on 15 June 1940, which was immediately 
followed by the mass deportation of 30,000 Lithuanians to 
Siberia.86 Resistance was organized under the aegis of the 
Lithuanian Activist Front in October 1940." The OUN 
developed its military arm, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army 
(UPA) and began organized armed resistance against the 
84 Yuriy Tys-Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in the ~kraine (New 
York: Society of Veterans of Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Inc., 
1972) , 10-20. 
8%ikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Uto~ia in Power 
(New York: Summit Books, 1982), 453. 
86 Girnius,  collectivization, 462. 
8 7 ~ . ~ .  Taurus, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast (New 
York: Voyages Press, 1962), 21. 
Germans in late 1942 and had its first clashes with Soviet 
partisans in early 1943." ~lthough the LAF had. not begun 
widespread armed resistance yet, when the Soviets returned 
to Lithuania in April 1944 the NKVD Commissar of State 
Security for Lithuania noted extensive distribution of 
counter-revolutionary leaflets. 89 
I The Moscow emissaries sent to defeat the anti-Soviet I insurgencies were both future Kremlin luminaries. Mikhail I Suslov, future party ideologist, and Nikita Khrushchev, I future general secretary, took charge of the situations in I Lithuania and the Ukraine, respectively. Their common goals I were to rebuild the party structures, begin recovery from I the war, and destroy the resistance movements. As prime I minister and first secretary of the Ukraine, Khrushchevvs I responsibilities were broader than Suslov's. However, the I two faced different challenges; the LFA network encompassed I all of Lithuania while the UPA network was not as well 
developed but covered a much larger territory than all of 
Lithuania. 
"~nri~ue Martinez Codo, IIGuerrilla Warfare in the 
Ukraine," Militarv Review 40, no. 8 (November 1960), 4; and 
Tys-Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare, 1972. 
89 Tauras, Qt, 22. 
'O~ikita Khrushchev, JOlrushchev Remembers, trans. Strobe 
Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970): 227-244; 
and Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 73-94. 
Nevertheless, the political campaigns against the 
LFA and UPA had similar characteristics from the start. In 
a move that echoed the Soviet characterization of the 
Basmachi as bandits, Suslov and Khrushchev both referred to 
the insurgents of the LFA and UPA as bandits and Nazi 
sympathizers. The LFA insurgents were labeled as "Hitlerite 
helpers" and Khrushchev coined the phrase "Ukrainian-German 
nationalistw to link tne UPA to the Nazi occ~piers.~' This 
/ 
was a characteristic theme carried through counterinsurgent 
campaign in an effort to shift the burden of guilt for 
wartime devastation and destruction onto the resistance 
movements. It failed, however, to achieve its goal of 
driving a wedge between the people and their liberation 
movements. In both cases, the insurgents enjoyed widespread 
support. This was especially true in Lithuania where the 
LFA had well-developed networks of informers, underground 
presses, and large numbers of Lithuanians appointed to 
official posts by the Soviets but willing to aid the cause. 
The UPA, while it enjoyed widespread support in the Western 
Ukraine, never extended its activities on a long-term basis 
into the East. Yet while the UPA did not have the extensive 
support that the LFA did, Khrushchev overstates the loyalty 
"Frederic Smith, "The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine 
Against Soviet PowerIt1 in: Combat on Communist Territorv, ed. 
Charles Moser (Lake Bluff, Illinois: Free Congress Foundation, 
1985), 10: and David R. Marples, "The Kulak in Post-War USSR: 
The West Ukrainian  example,^^ Soviet Studies 36, no. 4 (October 
1984) , 563. 
of the Ukrainians to the Soviet state in his memoirs and 
even goes so far as to omit any mention of the UPA." 
Besides needing to overcome the effective propaganda 
networks of the insurgents, the Soviet propaganda campaign 
had the reputation of the Soviets themselves to overcome, a 
formidable task. The Lithuanians saw "mass arrests, 
deportations, terror and murder ... returning with the Soviet 
tanks."" At the same time, "the Soviet authorities (in the 
Ukraine)...did not manage to create serious class 
divisions...but they did create an attitude of hostility 
among the peasantry .... t ' 84  Yet this does not seem to have 
greatly concerned the Soviets and this differentiates the 
campaigns in Lithuania and the Ukraine from the struggle 
with the Basmachi; the Soviets seemed less concerned with 
affecting the attitudes of the Lithuanian and Ukrainian 
population through propaganda and expedient political 
concessions than they had 20 years before with the Muslims 
of Central Asia. Instead, they committed sufficient 
manpower resources to Lithuania and the Ukraine to strangle 
the opposition in spite of anti-Soviet resentment and 
continued nationalist sentiment. 
SZKhrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 229. 
g3~auras, ~uerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 32. 
94 Marples, "The Kulak," 568. 
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This is not to say that the Soviets neglected party 
work and re-education ds means of pacifying the regions. 
During the first three months after the Red Army reclaimed 
Lithuania, the Soviets dispatched 1000 party loyalists into 
the countryside to begin building district and party 
committees. In spite of LFA imposed boycotts of elections, 
by 1947 87.8 percent of delegates to the Supreme Soviet were 
Lithuanian and over 65 percent of Komsomol secretaries were 
Lithuanian by 1949. Still, by 1948 Lithuanians only 
represented 18.6 percent of membership in the Lithuanian 
Communist Party and many who accepted appointments either 
neglected their jobs or cooperated with the LFA. 
Lithuanians were slow to cooperate since the Soviets were 
still perceived as occupiers. In addition, the LFA targeted 
party activists for assassination, killing, by their own 
estimate 4000 Communist activists between 1945 and 1952. 95 
In the Ukraine, where the east was relatively secure 
from insurgent activity and a party structure was quickly 
revived, Khrushchev concentrated on "re-educati~n,'~ sending 
6000 Russian and East Ukrainian teachers to the West Ukraine 
in 1945. The UPA began a program to protect Ukrainian 
culture in schools in 1947 by pressuring teachers to teach 
s5~irnius, "The Collectivization of Lithuanian 
Agriculture, 1944-1950," 462-463; and Tauras, Guerrilla 
Warfare on the Amber Coast, 52. 
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in Ukrainian and give a nationalist slant to history and 
geography instruction. 96 
The only other relatively benign political measure 
used against the resistance movements was amnesty offers 
designed to weaken insurgent resolve and thin their ranks 
without costing the lives of Communist forces. In both 
cases the first amnesty offer was the most effective, 
gaining the surrender of the least committed insurgents 
immediately. In the Ukraine, the Soviets made six amnesty 
offers between 1944 and 1947. The most successful was the 
May 1945 offer which gained the surrender of the thousands 
who had joined the UPA only to avoid the Soviet manpower 
mobilization. Other amnesty campaigns met with little 
97 success. The first amnesty offer in Lithuania was made in 
February 1946. The LFA gives no number for those who 
accepted the amnesty but does admit that the departure eased 
some supply problems, hinting at significant numbers of 
defectors. 98 
In spite of efforts to propagandize and re-educate, 
the Soviets relied much more heavily on political 
intimidation and terror in the Ukraine and Lithuania than 
0601eh Martovych, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Amy," 
Ukrainian Review 30, no. 3 (1982), 17. 
"~eller, Uto~ia in Power, 454;  and Petro R. Sodol, "The 
Ukraine Insurgent Army," Strateav and Tactics (September/ 
October, 1985), 12. 
96~auras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 80-82. 
52 
they had in Turkestan during the twenties. There is much 
less evidence (in fact, almost none) of Soviet efforts to 
placate the populations in the Ukraine and Baltic area with 
the kind of political concessions made to the Moslim 
insurgents. Collective responsibility was revived in both 
campaigns as a device to separate the LFA and UPA from their 
support. Mass arrests, executions, deportations, and show 
trials were all elements of the campaigns of terror against 
both national groups.'' The NKVD network of informers helped 
sustain the atmosphere of terror and presented one of the 
greatest challenges to the resistance movements. However, 
in the Ukraine, where NKVD infiltration efforts often 
failed, the Soviets often resorted to destruction of entire 
I villages and mass deportations. 100 I Mass deportations had become a standard measure of 
the Stalinist system anyway, and had appeared in both I 
"~auras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 33-34 ; and 
Tys-Krokhmaliuk, - 280. 
100 Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 49 and 80- 
82 describes the vulnerability of the LFA to infiltration by 
the NKVD and the LFA8s preoccupation with NKVD activity. Tys- 
Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukrab, 282-284 describes NKVD 
infiltration of the UPA, factories, collective farms, and 
schools and their enforcement of collective responsibility. 
The term NKVD is used throughout this paper for the sake of 
clarity and simplicity. During the period in question the 
NKVD went through several reorganizations as the NKGB, MGB- 
MVD, and KI but the functions of the secret police forces and 
internal security troops engaged in Lithuania and the Ukraine 
did not change; Harriet Fast Schott and William F. Scott, The 
Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979): 218- 
219. 
Lithuania and the Ukraine immediately after their Soviet 
takeovers in 1939 and 1940. Once the Soviets reoccupied the 
two regions deportations reappeared as an instrument of 
political control. In Turkestan forced migration to 
Afghanistan had served the same purpose that mass 
deportations now served for the Soviets. In the earlier 
case, the Soviets desired only to remove undesirable 
elements from their territory; the Ukrainians and 
Lithuanians would remain on Soviet territory as slave labor 
in Siberia. 
Mass deportations were conducted under the guise of 
enforcement of collectivization and dekulakization, themes 
of the anti-Basmachi campaign. Collectivization and 
dekulakization were useful in expropriating undesirable 
elements of the population and in cowing those who remained 
behind. Eight mass deportations were conducted in Lithuania 
between 1945 and 1950, resulting in the relocation of 
350,000 people (more than 10 percent of the population. 101 
Between 500,000-800,000 (six percent of the population) in 
the Ukraine was deported in October 1947. '02 Of all their 
non-military measures against the UPA and the LFA, the 
Soviet's collectivization programs may have been the most 
damaging. In spite of the insurgents' efforts to disrupt 
101 Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 59. 
I02 Marples, "The Kulak in Post-War USSR," 566. 
5 4 
collectivization the program continued and made it 
increasingly difficult for the insurgents of both regions to 
obtain food. lo3 
An interesting aspect of collectivization in the 
Ukraine was that it was among the first actions that the 
Soviets took against the Uniate (Catholic) Church. The 1944 
directive that began land reform included churches on the 
list of those to be expropriated.lo4 This action was 
followed in 1945 by the imprisonment and deportation of 
church officials including Metropolitan Slipyi, bishops, 
priests, and theological students. Finally the Uniate 
church was forced into union with the Russian Orthodox 
Church in March 1946.1°5 This was a significant departure 
from the efforts to win over the Muslim clergy through 
concessions to Islam carried out by Turkkomissia in 
Turkestan. 
A final element of the land reform program was the 
Soviet's efforts through dekulakization to create a class 
war in both regions. They hoped to turn the resistance into 
a civil war by creating artificial class distinctions and 
antagonisms through taxation and redistribution of land and 
property. However, the peasant populations were essentially 
103~artovych, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 14. 
104 Marples, "The Kulak in Post-War USSR, 563. 
10kartovy~h, "Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 7. 
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homogeneous in terns of wealth and UPA and LFA pressure 
against participation added to the peasant's natural 
disinclination to take their neighbor's land so the 
frictions the Soviets hoped to exploit never arose.lo6 
The Soviets were able to carry out their campaign 
against the UPA and LFA without outside interference or 
protests in spite of the developing Cold War atmosphere. 
This was largely a result of their own efforts to isolate 
the movements and keep them "blacked out" in the media. 
After 1946, when some UPA and LFA bands managed to penetrate 
other Eastern Bloc countries and even Austria, the Communist 
press throughout the Bloc condemned the insurgents as 
bandits and kept their coverage to a minimum. None of this 
is surprising, however, and the only difference between the 
post-war campaigns and the anti-Basmachi struggle was that 
Turkestan in the 1920's was so remote that it took no effort 
to prevent press coverage. More interesting is the reaction 
of the West after the liberation movements had achieved 
contact. One of the most demoralizing events for the LFA 
was the failure of the Vatican to respond with even moral 
support to an appeal from Lithuanian Catholics. The LFA9s 
successful exfiltration of insurgents through Poland to the 
West also met with disappointing results. lo' Surprisingly, 
10%larples, "The ~ u l a k  in Post-War USSR, 563 ; and Tauras, 
Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 66. 
lo7~auras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 89-95. 
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the insurgents of both regions remained a non-cause in the 
West, isolated and unaided even though the CIA established 
contacts with them, flying agents into the Ukraine and 
occasionally dropping agents in Lithuania by PT boat for 
intelligence gathering purposes. lo' This degree of isolation 
meant that even when the UPA established contact with the 
LFA the insurgents derived little or no benefit from it 
since neither organization had meaningful contact or outside 
support. The continued isolation, probably as hoped by the 
Soviets, had a strong demoralizing effect on the insurgent 
groups, leaving them even more vulnerable to the impact of 
the other elements of the Soviet counterinsurgency 
campaign. 109 
Taken together, the elements of the political 
campaign against the insurgents contributed to the demise of 
the Ukrainian and Lithuanian resistance movements. Although 
the Soviets departed from their earlier practices against 
- - -  
108 See William Colby, Honorable Men: Mv Life in the CIA 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 104; John Ranelagh, The 
Aaencv: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1986), 137; and Thomas Powers, 
Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred Knopf, 
1979), 39. Ranelagh writes that since the operations involved 
areas acknowledged as Soviet territory they were "tantamount 
to war. It demonstrated the determination with which the 
United States entered the Cold War. It also demonstrated a 
cold ruthlessness: the Ukrainian resistance had no hope of 
winning unless America was prepared to go to war, America was 
in effect encouraging Ukrainians to go to their deaths." 
10%artovych, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 'I 22 ; and 
Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 89-95. 
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the Basmachi in a few instances, the methods employed were 
generally similar. However, the counterinsurgent campaigns 
against the UPA and the LFA did differ from the earlier 
campaign in one fundamental way; political measures were 
secondary in the post-war campaigns and the political 
concessions aimed at placating the resistance which were so 
important during the Basmachi campaign were not employed at 
all. This resulted in a much heavier reliance on military 
force to crush the insurgent organizations. The immediate 
commitment of much larger military forces to the campaigns 
in Lithuania and the Ukraine indicates that this was an 
intentional policy and not the result of political failure, 
as in the case of the increased military commitments in the 
future campaign in Afghanistan. 
B. THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE UPA AND THE LFA 
The separate military campaigns against the Lithuanian 
and Ukrainian insurgents were as similar as the political 
methods used. In both cases the Soviets demonstrated their 
intention to batter the resistance movements into submission 
with military force. Sufficient resources were committed in 
each region to accomplish this goal without resorting to 
softening of the Soviet political goal-the installation of 
Stalinist party structures. In both cases this simple, 
direct approach succeeded. 
The Lithuanian and Ukrainian resistance movements 
differed from the Muslim uprisings that preceded and 
followed them in that they were both organized and well 
armed from the start of the conflicts. Both were armed with 
weapons captured from the retreating Germans when the 
Soviets arrived and both replenished their supplies with 
captured Soviet weaponry during the course of their 
 conflict^."^ Unlike the Muslim insurgencies in Turkestan 
and Afghanistan, the LFA and UPA were not weakened by 
factional or tribal conflict. Quite the opposite, they were 
both cohesive organizations without conflicts of interest 
and both possessed the single goal of national liberation. 
The main difference between the two was that the Ukrainian 
resistance movement had organized a military arm to fight 
the Germans which it turned against the Soviets in 1943 
while the Lithuanian Activist Front had concentrated on 
political resistance against the Germans and only organized 
its insurgent groups, which began fighting the Soviets in 
1944, into the LFA in 1947. 
Consequently, the Soviets recognized the Ukrainian 
threat earlier and directed their partisans operating behind 
German lines to contain the LFA in the Western Ukraine and 
to destroy it if possible. In fact, after Soviet partisans 
entered the Western Ukraine in 1943 the UPA engaged them 54 
llO~artovych, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 25 ; . Tauras, 
Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 11. 
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times and fought the Germans only 43 times by the end of the 
year. After the Soviets reclaimed the Western Ukraine the 
NKVD immediately began raids against the UPA. 
Although the LAF had not engaged in widespread guerrilla 
war with the Germans, resistance forces in Lithuania clashed 
with NKVD troops immediately after the German retreat. 
Insurgent groups varying in size from dozens to hundreds 
were formed and established themselves in the Lithuanian 
forests. The groups eventually evolved into a Northern and 
Southern district and were finally unified in 1947 under the 
LFA command headquartered in Vilnius. 112 
Because of their differing backgrounds the LFA and UPA 
used different methods in their attacks of Soviet forces. 
The LFA, the smaller and less experienced in guerrilla 
warfare of the two, tended to operate in smaller units than 
the UPA and avoided, when possible, clashes with large 
Soviet forces. The LFA claimed to have 30,000 troops in 
1944 and used them in assassinations of party officials and 
ambushes of the NKVD, avoiding, "attacking sizeable NKVD 
detachments in larger Lithuanian cities. Instead, groups of 
two or three freedom fighters would stage surprise raids.s1113 
lll~ys-~rokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, 226, 243-247, 
275-277. 
l12~auras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 26-31, 31- 
34. 
113 Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 49. 
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1. The Counterinsuraent Cam~aian in the Ukr- 
The UPA, which had been battling the Germans for 
several years already and claimed to have 200,000 troops in 
1944, was organized in battalions and companies. They 
sought out units of Soviet partisans and often defeated them 
in 1943 and 1944. ~uring the first NKVD-Red Army operations 
against them the UPA stayed in company and battalion 
formations and engaged the Soviet forces. 114 
Soviet activity against the insurgents in early 1944 
was limited to raids by NKVD "punitive unitsn against which 
the UPA was fairly successful. The Soviets greatly 
increased the pressure on the UPA after the insurgents 
assassinated Marshal Vatutin in   arch.'" The Soviets 
immediately launched the first major sweep against the UPA, 
attacking the Northern region with a 30,000 man force with 
114 Ukrainian sources seem to claim 200,000 most often as 
UPA troop strength in 1944, see Codo, "Guerrilla Warfare in 
the Ukraine," 7; and Tys-Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, 
300. One Ukrainian source, Sodol, "The Ukrainian Insurgent 
Army," 11, claims only 30,000 UPA troops in 1944. Smith, "The 
War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against Soviet Powerl1l 12, 
believes that 100,000, instead of 200,000, is %loser to the 
truthp1 but Smith, 17 offers the estimate of 50,000 attributed 
to General Vlasov during the time that he considered joining 
forces with the UPA. 
115~ys-Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in 297. Vatutin 
was wounded in a UPA ambush on 26 March and died a few days 
later. Ukrainian sources point out that the Soviets never 
admitted that the UPA was responsible for Vatutin's death. 
However, not all Ukrainian sources mention that the UPA-North 
commander and his chief of staff both also lost their lives in 
the Vatutin ambush; Codo, llGuerrilla Warfare in the Ukraine," 
13. 
aircraft and artillery support and composed of two infantry 
divisions, two NKVD brigades, an armored brigade, two NKVD 
frontier police regiments, and militia and partisan units. 
The operation, called the Cheka-Military operations for the 
Liquidation of the German-Ukrainian Nationalist Bands was 
aimed at bagging the approximately 5000 UPA insurgents 
operating around Volhynia and Polessia. The UPA force 
managed to extract itself while inflicting 33 percent 
casualties on the Soviets. However, the UPA units forced to 
disperse into the southern territories as a result of the 
Soviet sweep suffered heavy casualties as they crossed the 
more open countryside. The pressure caused the UPA Supreme 
Command to order all UPA battalions to breakdown into 
company size. 116 
In the aftermath of the Vatutin assassination Soviet 
pressure on the UPA was unrelenting until 1946. Soviet 
forces established a strong occupation presence countrywide 
and pauses in counterinsurgency sweeps were only long enough 
to allow reinforcement and reconstitution. The Soviets 
launched a second operation in July in which collective 
responsibility was used to strike at UPA support. Villages 
were burned, collaborators were summarily executed or 
deported and, in preparation for future sweeps, the Soviets 
?Smith, **The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against 
Soviet Power," 17; Tys-Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, 
296-297, 315-316. 
began to burn the forest of the West Ukraine. The pressure 
on the UPA was great enough that it was forced to consider 
shifting its operations to the East, an option that was 
abandoned. 117 
Still, the Soviets were frustrated in their efforts 
to destroy the Ukraine and Stalin appointed Khrushchev as 
first secretary of the Ukraine in the summer of 1944, 
charging him with the destruction of the UPA by 15 March 
1945 and promising him unlimited men and equipment for the 
task.''' In the fall of 1944 Khrushchev initiated the first 
region-wide offensive against the UPA. Twenty divisions of 
mostly NKVD troops with heavy weapons and armored support 
were used to sweep the countryside for insurgents. Although 
the size and disposition of the UPA forces forced the 
Soviets to disperse their own troops, the Soviets were still 
able to achieve local force superiority in all districts. 
They blockaded the terrain surrounding areas of UPA 
activity, blockaded villages and established roadblocks. 
The insurgents were pinned down for weeks unable to escape 
or conduct reconnaissance, obtain food and supplies, or 
re-disperse. The UPA nevertheless remained in units and 
tried to engage the Soviet forces. As a result they 
suffered heavy losses among their leadership and manpower 
117 Tys-Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, 299. 
1'8~ys-~rokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, 299-300. 
that disorganized the field unit organization and disrupted 
inter-unit liaison. Although the pace of UPA activity would 
rise and decline several times in the following years, the 
UPA never completely recovered from the first Khrushchev 
offensive. 118 . 
As Khrushchev's operations continued into 1945 the 
UPA began to give in to the incessant pounding. The units, 
which had been equipped with heavy machineguns, mortars, and 
some artillery, began to divest themselves of all but the 
lightest weapons in order to stay on the move during Soviet 
sweeps. The Supreme Command ordered the units to begin to 
avoid pitched battles and only use partisan warfare 
techniques of hit and run, and only against inferior units. 
Finally, as the war with Germany began to wind down and the 
UPA leadership realized that they would soon face even more 
powerful Soviet forces, the Supreme Command began what 
Ukrainian sources describe as the UPAts transformation from 
a military force into an underground organization. 120 
As the UPA devolved to smaller units, the Soviets 
also shifted their tactics. NKVD troops began to occupy 
villages permanently while other forces attacked the UPA in 
raias and ambushes. Mines were laid on approaches to 
villages and in the forests. The informer network was 
lls~ys-~rokhmali~k, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, 300-304. 
lZo~odol, **The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, " 11 ; Tys- 
Krokhmaliuk, -, 304-307. 
developed further and UPA supply caches and printing presses 
were sought out. As 1945 wore on the Soviets used blockades 
of entire districts to strangle the UPA. Still, the UPA 
remained active and its propaganda began to affect the 
Soviet troops. Operations were halted briefly in mid-year 
in order to replace Red Army units with NKVD troops. Petro 
Grigorenko, then a Red Army general describes in his memoirs 
how army friends returning from service in the Ukraine were 
disgusted with the methods used to suppress the resistance. 
During this period the UPA able to make a brief show of 
strength by seizing and holding the town of Stanislaviv for 
several days. 121 
Finally, after the unreliable troops were replaced, 
Khrushchev launched the "Great Blockade" of Winter 
1945-1946. The blockade was a combined military and 
ideological thrust against the UPA in retaliation for the 
. 
Ukrainian boycott of elections to the Supreme Soviet. 
Employing nearly 600,000 NKVD troops, the Soviets garrisoned 
every village in the West Ukraine. Once the villages were 
occupied the Soviets began a sweep that proceeded from house 
to house. There was sufficient manpower for a close search 
of the surrounding countryside for bunkers and arms caches. 
Most of the forests of the West Ukraine were burned during 
the blockade in order to deny the UPA its natural base of 
- 
12%mith, "The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against 
Soviet Power," 18. 
operations. The blockade was so tight that the UPA found 
contact with supporters among the population increasingly 
difficult and were often forced, in their desperation to 
obtain supplies, to attack village garrisons in order to 
penetrate the blockade. But the UPA was growing weaker and 
the Soviets stronger. The NKVD-Red Army forces, which had 
suffered high casualty rates in their early operations 
against the UPA, reduced the ratio of UPA to Soviet 
casualties from 1:10 to 1:3 between January and July 1946. 
Satisfied with the results of the blockade, Moscow ordered 
its conclusion and declared the UPA defeated in June 1946. 122 
The UPA would not admit defeat, however, and 
disbanded its battalions and companies after the conclusion 
of the Great Blockade to continue as an "undergroundu 
organization. Armed resistance at a lower level continued 
from 1946 to 1950 although the UPA was now limited to the 
kind of small unit activities and assassinations that the 
LFA engaged in during the first years of its struggle. The 
largest UPA operations after 1946 were attacks of state 
farms and other efforts to disrupt collectivization and some 
insurgent activity on Polish territory during 1947. A joint 
Soviet, Czech, and Polish offensive against the UPA on 
12%lartovy~h, ##The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, " 10 ; Smith, 
"The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against Soviet P ~ w e r , ~ ~  
19; Sodol, "The ~krainian Insurgent Army," 12; Tys- 
Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, 304-310. 
123~artovy~h, "The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 11. 
Polish territory cost the UPA 7500 casualties. As the 
strength of the UPA dwindled away, it concentrated on a 
series of propaganda "raidsw into Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Eastern Ukraine, and even Austria. Although the raids broke 
the Soviet news blackout they failed to gain the UPA any 
outside support. 12" 
By the summer of 1949 the UPA was reduced to several 
cadre-strength units in the Carpathian Mountains. Heavy 
losses among these forces caused General Shuchewycz, the UPA 
commander since 1943, to deactivate the remaining units in 
September. Shuchewycz was killed by NKVD troops in March 
1950 and the Supreme Command officially concluded the armed 
resistance phase in July. 125 
2. The Counterinsursent Cam~aisn in Lithuania 
The Soviets used the same methods against the LFA as 
they did against the Ukrainian insurgents. The main 
difference between the two campaigns was that the size and 
tactics of the LFA kept the level of conflict at a lower 
level in Lithuania. The NKVD troops maintained a strong 
presence throughout the country and conducted frequent 
sweeps against the insurgents but operations in Lithuania 
- - 
124~artovy~hI **Ukrainian Insurgent Amy, 18-23 ; Smith, 
"The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against Soviet PowertV8 
19; Tys-Krokhmaliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, 308, 390-391. 
125~odo, ltGuerrilla Warfare in the Ukraine,8t 14; Martovych, 
"The Ukrainian Insurgent Army,8* 11; Sodol, "The Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army, 12 ; Tys-~rokhialiuk, YPA Warfare in Ukraine, 
310-311, 390. 
did not usually attain the size or tempo of those in the 
Ukraine. Nevertheless, the war was costly for both sides; 
the Lithuanian Communist Party claims to have lost 20,000 
people during the active period of fighting, from 1944 to 
1952. The LCP claims that the 20,000 insurgents were also 
killed during the same period but non-communist sources 
claim that LFA losses totaled 30,000. NKVD (i.e., Russian 
losses) have been placed as high as 80,000 men between 1945 
and 1949. 126 
The Soviets stationed several NKVD divisions in 
Lithuania as occupation forces after 1944. The NKVD 
manpower commitment was sufficient to allow widespread 
surveillance of the population and frequent I1combing 
throughu operations against the insurgents in town and in 
the countryside. 12' In addition to their routine operations, 
the NKVD ran three large sweeps during 1946. The operations 
ranged in size from 7000-15,000 NKVD troops and netted 
nearly 500 insurgents between June and September although 
they also cost the lives of about 400 Soviet troops. 128 
As more Soviet troops poured into the country, the 
Lithuanian insurgent losses climbed, with the LFA estimating 
lZ6smith, ltThe War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against 
Soviet Power,ll 7 ;  Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber 
Coast, 50. 
"'~auras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 82. 
lZ8smith, "The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against 
Soviet Power, 10. 
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that it lost 5500 troops a year during the peak of the 
fighting. The LFA simply could not make up for these losses 
against the Soviets, who could afford to reinforce the 
50,000 NKVD troops in Lithuania with 60,000 Red Army 
soldiers to keep the peace during the 1947 elections. Iz9 1n 
1949 the Soviets deployed air force units in support of 
eight army divisions and 830,000->0,000 NKVD troops in a 
final drive to clean up the remaining LFA units, which had a 
total of 5000 active combatants left. The persistent, 
grinding effect of the Soviet operations reduced the LFA to 
only 4000 insurgents by 1950. Soviet operations had killed 
30,000 insurgents and cost the LFA 90 percent of its cadres. 
Collectivization had effectively cut off the LFAts food 
supply and complete isolation from the outside world in 
spite of efforts to establish contacts and gain outside 
support completed the demoralization of the remnants of the 
resistance movement. Finally, the LFA command demobilized 
its armed resistance effort in 1952 .I3' 
C. LESSONS OF THE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE LFA AND THE UPA 
The campaigns in Lithuania and the Ukraine present an 
image of patterns and variations in Soviet methods of 
12%mith, "The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against 
Soviet Power," 7-9. 
"'smith, "The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against 
Soviet Power, 11; Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber 
Coast, 78-80, 87, 96. 
counterinsurgency. Compared to the earlier struggle with 
the Basmachi, Lithuania and the Ukraine demonstrate a Soviet 
tendency to rely on several weapons against insurgencies. 
Mass terror, deportations, collectivization, massive 
firepower all reoccur and become familiar as Soviet 
counterinsurgency devices. 
Yet the nature of the wars in Lithuania and the Ukraine 
overturn the image created in Turkestan of the Soviets as 
expert and subtle counterinsurgents attuned to the political 
side of insurgency. In Turkestan the Soviets deftly beat 
their opponents with a stick while offering them a carrot, 
in Lithuania and the Ukraine they simply battered their 
enemy into a stupor. In doing so, the Soviets were willing 
to pay a much higher price then they had been in Turkestan 
or would be in Afghanistan. The Ukrainians and Lithuanians 
generally found the Soviets willing to take very heavy 
losses. l3' All of this contrasts strangely with the war in 
Afghanistan, where the Soviets made some use of political 
concessions but at the same time conducted the bloodiest 
counterinsurgent war in their history, all the while 
displaying an extreme reluctance to take casualties of their 
own. The wars in Lithuania and the Ukraine, so often 
neglected in examinations of Soviet counterinsurgent 
%3mith, #*The War in Lithuania and the Ukraine Against 
Soviet Po~er,'~ 11; Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber 
Coast, 85; Tys-Krokhmaliuk, VPA Warfare in Ukraine, 221-224. 
warfare, offer several interesting insights to the pattern 
of Soviet behavior in counterinsurgencies. 
V. SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN 
The Soviet Army was an aggressive and self confident 
force when it invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. 
Afghanistan was to be the proving ground for the army's new 
"external function."132 The Soviets believed that victory 
would be swift, a view shared by western observers. Nine 
hard years later victory was still so distant that the 
Soviets saw no option but withdrawal. Although the regime 
they had come to save was tottering on the brink of collapse 
the final Soviet battles in Afghanistan were fought not in 
defense of Kabul but to keep the Salang Highway open long 
enough to get all the troops out and meet the withdrawal 
deadline. The initial Soviet confidence had proven to be 
overconfidence and the correlation of forces, once 
calculated as so favorable, had betrayed the Soviets. 
The Soviet Union learned in Afghanistan the same lesson 
that the United States learned in Vietnam; in counterinsur- 
gency the appropriateness of the force applied is as 
'32~onstantin A. Vorob'yev, uDevelopment of the External 
Function of the Army of the Soviet State of the Entire People 
at the Present Stage," in: The Soviet Art of War, ed. Harriet 
Fast Scott and William F. Scott (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1982), 253-256. The Scotts describe this work, which 
emphasizes the army's role in fighting counterr@volution and 
was published shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan, as 
the most candid discussion of the external function of the 
Soviet Army since the issue was first raised in the early 
seventies. 
important for success as the amount of force. The Soviets 
were doctrinally unprepared to fight a counterinsurgent war 
when they invaded Afghanistan and so did not have the 
appropriate military force to apply to the situation. This 
chapter examines the Soviet methods of counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan and the reasons for their failure. However, 
this is not an argument for how the Soviets could have won 
in Afghanistan had they been doctrinally prepared for 
counterinsurgency. For Afghanistan appears in retrospect to 
have been as much of a quagmire for the Soviets as Vietnam 
was for the United States. Yet if Afghanistan was winnable, 
it could not have been won by the methods that the Soviets 
employed. On the other hand, better preparation for the 
special demands of counterinsurgent warfare might have 
brought victory and at the very least would have prevented 
such an ignominious defeat. More theoretical and doctrinal 
attention to the problems of counterinsurgency also might 
have precluded a Soviet invasion. 
As it was, the war developed in three phases, each the 
result of Soviet ineptitude in counterinsurgency. First was 
the invasion and its immediate aftermath between December 
1979 and February 1980. The Soviets found, to their 
surprise, that the mujahideen resistance did not collapse 
upon the seizure of Kabul and so made quick adjustments 
before "mopping uptt the rebels. The second phase lasted 
from February 1980 to 26 September 1986. During this phase 
73 
the mujahideen were hard pressed by the Soviet operations 
and most western observers predicted that they would be 
ground down and defeated in a long war of attrition. The 
third and final phase of the war began on 26 September 1986, 
the day that the mujahideen first used the Stinger surface 
to air missile, and ended on 15 February 1989 with the final 
Soviet withdrawal. 133 
Although military operations conveniently define the 
phases of the war in Afghanistan, it is important also to 
examine the social-political aspects of the Soviet 
counterinsurgency effort. All too often the political 
nature of insurgent or guerrilla war is neglected. This 
neglect is often the root cause of the failure of 
counterinsurgency campaigns. The Clausewitzian dictum of 
war as the continuation of politics by violent means applies 
in perhaps its purest sense to guerrilla warfare. In 
guerrilla war many Clausewitzian concepts, such as the 
offensive and battles of annihilation, are negated or 
rendered neutral while such factors as the relationship of 
war to politics, moral factors, and will become all 
important. Political considerations may be partially and 
temporarily submerged in favor of military operations during 
most forms of warfare; in guerrilla war the side that yields 
133~obert Pear, "Arming Afghan Guerrillas: A Huge Effort 
Led by U.S. ,I1 New York Times, 18 ,April 1988, A1 and All, 
describes the U.S. supply effort and first use of the Stinger 
in Afghanistan. 
most to this temptation loses. There is some irony and no 
small lesson on Soviet warfighting style in the fact that 
the Soviets, who may be the purest Clausewitzians of the 
great powers, were defeated by their own rigid application 
of some Clausewitzian principles while ignoring others. 
Examination of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan 
leads to several conclusions. First, the Soviet armed 
forces were unprepared to fight an insurgency in 1979 when 
they entered Afghanistan and remain so today, even after 
nine years of experience in counterinsurgency. This is 
largely attributable to the lack of theoretical and 
doctrinal attention paid to counterinsurgent warfare by the 
Soviets as described in chapter 11. Several additional 
operational weaknesses, to be outlined below, that are not 
directly attributable to Soviet weakness in counterinsur- 
gency aggravated the effects of this unpreparedness. 
Finally, while it is important to consider the 
social-political counterinsurgent programs used by the 
Soviets in Afghanistan, since the Soviets relied most 
heavily on military means in the counterinsurgent campaign 
the effects of the military operations tended to overshadow 
the social-political aspects of the war and to be 
counterproductive to the social-political programs of the 
campaign. Quite simply, military operations defined the 
nature of the entire counterinsurgent program in Afghanistan 
when, as described above, social-political considerations 
should have. All of these factors contribuked to the Soviet 
defeat. 
A. SOCIAL-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENT 
CAMPAIGN: SOVIETIZATION 
The "massive, well-coordinated of Soviet 
penetration and control of Afghanistan began in 1955 with a 
$3,000,000 arms sale. From that small beginning the Soviets 
were able, by 1978, to penetrate and control Afghanistan 
politically, militarily, and economically. During the 
intervening 23 years the United States failed to respond to 
the trend towards Soviet hegemony in Afghanistan and did not 
react until the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. 
During that time the Soviet program of penetration and 
control resulted in Afghan dependence on Soviet weapons 
supplies, the training of thousands of Afghans in the Soviet 
Union, and the placement of hundreds of Soviet advisors in 
Afghanistan. It all culminated in the 1978 coup dtetat 
which placed a Soviet sponsored communist party in power in 
Afghanistan. Thousands of Soviet advisors promptly poured 
into the country and were placed at every level of the 
government and the military. As many as 20,000 Soviet 
134 Muhammad R. Azmi, %oviet Politico-Military Penetration 
in Afghanistan, 1955 to 1979,It Armed Forces and Societv 12, 
no. 3 (Spring 1986), provides thorough coverage of soviet 
involvement in Afghanistan before the invasion. Anthony 
- 
Arnold, ~fahanistan. the Soviet Invasion in Pers~ective 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985) also outlines the 
pre-invasion Soviet involvement in ~f~haniitan, including PDPA 
attitudes towards the Soviets. 
troops entered the country to assist in the consolidation of 
communist power. It was during this period that active 
resistance to the communist regime's programs and Soviet 
influence began to take root in the countryside. 
Eventually, the regime's inability to control the situation 
led to the Soviet invasion. 
After the invasion they continued the three general 
approaches of military, economic, and political penetration, 
and added the extra dimension of countrywide sovietization. 
These programs were carried out behind a shield of military 
operations against the rebels that included a strategy of 
migratory genocide, an important element in the Soviet 
program to penetrate and control Afghanistan. Nine years of 
scorched-earth warfare created an Afghan refugee population 
of 6,000,000 people out of a total population of 
16,000,000. Nine percent of the Afghan population died as 
a result of the war.136 Military operations against the 
mujahideen therefore had a profound societal impact and 
obviously affected the social-political counterinsurgent 
programs. Though the migratory genocide program undoubtedly 
complicated life for the mujahideen it also had a great 
negative impact on the government's sovietization programs, 
135 Louis Dupree, "The Soviet Union and Afghanistan in 
1987,'* Current History, October 1987, 334. 
136~arp, "Eight Years of Occupation, " 19. 
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highlighting the counterproductive nature of the Soviet's 
military operations. 
The Soviets ensured their control of Afghanistan after 
the invasion by placing advisers in every ministry and 
attaching an adviser to every important Afghan official. 
Soviet approval of every important decision was required 
from the prime minister's office down to army units in the 
field. By 1984 Soviet civilian and military advisers in 
Afghanistan may have numbered as many as 15,000. Soviet 
military strength was also completely dominant with the 
number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan being more than twice 
the number of Afghan soldiers.13' 
With control of the People's Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) and the government firmly in hand after 
the invasion, the Soviets began their efforts to put the 
PDPA in firm control of the country. The main instruments 
of Soviet efforts to control and sovietize Afghanistan were 
the PDPA, the party's secret police (KHAD), the party 
organs, and the Afghan and Soviet armies. From the time of 
their invasion of Afghanistan Soviet intentions were clear. 
As one writer puts it: "There is no question that the 
ultimate Soviet goal is to turn ~fghanistan into a docile 
137~mst~tz, Afahanistan. The First Five Years, 884-888. 
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Marxist-Leninist satellite, and meantime to control all 
aspects of its administration. "13' 
The Soviets have fought Muslim guerrillas several times 
since the 1917 Revolution in order to subjugate Moslem 
ethnic groups within the Soviet Union. In 1981 Alexander 
Bennigsen outlined five historical lessons from those 
successful struggles and concluded that the Soviets had 
failed to apply them in Afghanistan. The five lessons were: 
"(1) divide the adversary; (2) win over crucial native 
groups; (3) create a strong indigenous Communist Party 
apparatus; (4) field a Muslim national army; and (5) create 
an Afghan national Communism.~'39 
The five lessons outlined in the Rand report are a 
concise representation of the essentials for Soviet victory 
in Afghanistan. However, Bennigsen's thesis that the 
Soviets were not using those lessons in Afghanistan was 
incorrect. The Soviet penetration efforts in Afghanistan 
between 1955 and 1978 already outlined make clear that the 
Soviet's were pursuing hegemony in Afghanistan through use 
of principles contained in lessons 3-5 and, after the 
beginnfng of Afghan resistance, applied the principles of 
13'Anthony Arnold, "The Stony Path to Afghan Socialism: 
Problems of Sovietization in an Alpine Muslim Society," Orbis 
29, no. 1 (Spring 1985) : 45.  
viet Union a 13'~lexandre Bennigsen, The So nd Muslim 
~uerrilla Wars, 1920-1981: Lessons for Afahanistan (Santa 
~onica: Rand, August 1981: N-1701/1). 
lessons 1 and 2. The failure of Soviet efforts to date may 
be attributed to the simple fact that the Afghan resistance 
thwarted most Soviet efforts to implement the historical 
- 
lessons of their previous struggles with Muslim guerrillas. . 
The Peoplets Democratic Party of Afghanistan was the 
- 
main instrument of sovietization. The PDPA may also have 
been the weakest link in the chain of oppression that bound 
Afghanistan. The party was split between the dominant 
Parchamis and the more radical Khalqis beginning in 1967. 
In addition to the effects of factionalism, the PDPA was 
further hobbled by its image among the Afghan population as 
a completely illegitimate proxy of the Soviets. Party 
membership after years of intensive recruitment effort 
remained well under one percent of the population and was 
- 
mostly confined to the army, the secret police, and 
government functionaries. So although the Soviets and the 
- 
. 
PDPA had worked since 1965 to develop a strong party 
apparatus and create Afghan national communism the goal 
remained distant. 
The National Fatherland Front (NFF), created in 1981, 
was the party organ that coordinated the overall 
sovietization effort in Afghanistan. The NFF, included 15 
sub-fronts such as: youth organizations, trade unions, 
religious councils, women's groups, and tribal councils, and 
. 
140~rnold, "The Stony Path, It 46. 
80 
was intended as a bridge between the PDPA and the Afghan 
people. The perception of party illegitimacy kept 
membership and participation in the NFF low and unpopular 
- 
. NFF duties such as enforcement of conscription further 
alienated it from the Afghan people. 141 
- 
The KHAD and the army were also unsuccessful instruments 
of sovietization. It was nearly impossible for the KHAD to 
infiltrate the clannish villages of the countryside where 
the resistance was centered14' and the army proved to be 
militarily ineffective and ideologically unsound; rather 
than contributing towards sovietization, whole army units 
have been known to defect. Desertions reduced the Afghan 
Army to half its 1979 strength of 90,000  men. KHAD forces 
were assigned to army units to forcibly prevent desertion. 
- 
The KHAD, which had 20,000 members whose loyalty was bought 
with high wages, attempted to disrupt the opposition through 
disinformation and assassinations. Its other mission was to 
suppress dissent within the population still under regime 
l4l~rnold, "The Stony Pathlg1 48-49. 
'42~rnold, "The Stony Path," 49-50. 
143~ilan Hauner, "Seizing the Third Parallel: Geopolitics 
and the Soviet Advance into Central Asia," Orbis, 29, no. 1 
(Spring 1985): 10. 
control. Terror and brutality were the KIiAD8s main 
weapons. 144 
Sovietization was pursued on three main fronts: social, 
economic, and religious. The social and economic aspects of 
. 
Sovietization represented the strongest long-term threat to 
Afghan independence. The Soviets, perhaps out of 
recognition of the success achieved by educational exchange 
prior to 1978, devoted a large part of their attention after 
the invasion to education and training of Afghans. 
The Afghan educational system was dependent on the 
Soviets and the PDPA claimed that 40 percent of teachers and 
30 percent of students were party members or members of a 
party front. In 1983 the Soviets claimed to be educating 
over 1,000,000 primary and 200,000 secondary students. At 
- 
the university level classes in Marxist philosophy were made 
mandatory. During 1984, 7500 Afghans were studying in the 
- 
Soviet Union. 145 
In response to some resistance among older Afghans to 
the education program the Soviets vastly expanded their 
sovietization efforts among the Afghan youth. An estimated 
50,000 teenagers had been sent to the Soviet Union for 
1'4~raig Karp, "Afghanistan: Eight Years of Soviet 
Occupati~n,~ De~artment of State Bulletin 88, no. 2132 (March 
1988) : 12. 
'"IZarp, "Eight Years of Occupation, l1 53-54. 
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education and training by 1985. 14 6 Part of this number 
participated in summer camp programs and returned to 
Afghanistan; as many as 10,000 Afghan youths remained in the 
Soviet Union for long-term civilian and military training. 147 
More permanent arrangements have been made for even younger 
children who have been placed in orphanages. In 1984, the 
Soviets sent 870 seven to nine-year olds to the Soviet Union 
for ten years of education in Soviet boarding schools. 
Unofficial reports claimed that many of the children had 
living parents. 148 
The Afghan economy, already highly dependent on the 
Soviet Union by 1978 was further sovietized after the 
invasion. Afghanistan has observer status in Comecon and a 
permanent Afghan-Soviet Commission on Economic and Planning 
Cooperation was established in Kabul. Collectivization of 
agriculture proceeded with 1000 collective farms, 50 state 
farms and several machine and tractor stations created by 
1983."' The sovietization of the Afghan economy was made 
even more clear by its economic Five-Year Plans that 
corresponded with the Soviet schedules and the direct 
negotiation of trade between Afghanistan and Central Asian 
146~auner, llSeizing the Third Parallel, 10. 
"7~arp, "Eight Years of Occupation, 17. 
'48~rnold, #*The Stony Path," 55. 
14'~lex R. Alexiev, llSoviet Strategy and the MujahedinIt8 
Orbis 29, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 34. 
83 
republics along the same lines as inter-republic trade 
within the Soviet Union.l5' Even as the military withdrawal 
got under way the Soviets implemented a new ten-year project 
to connect the nine provinces of Afghanistan, and eventually 
the entire country, to the Soviet power grid. Energy 
dependence of the northern region, which produces half the 
national income, could cripple Afghan efforts to become 
independent. lS1 
Sovietization was least successful in terms of 
reconciling atheistic socialism with Islam. The devout 
Afghan belief in Islam, along with the independent nature of 
the Afghan people, proved to be the source of the strongest 
resistance to sovietization. The Afghan regime and the 
Soviets tried to force the clergy to read Marxist messages 
in mosques and worked to infiltrate the Ulema, the college - 
of Islamic religious scholars and clergy, in order to 
promolgate the government message of the compatibility of 
socialism and Islam. The Soviets tried with the Muslim 
clergy the exchange program approach that proved so 
successful with the Afghan military but many who returned 
15'~rnold, "The Stony Path," 53. 
'='steven Weisman, laSoviet Strengthens Economic Links to 
Northern Afghanistan," New York Times, 20 May 1988, 9. 
from the Soviet Union admitted that they still believed 
"that the Soviet government is against  slam.^^'^^ 
B. SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN 
As outlined above, the war in Afghanistan had three 
phases. These phases developed out of Soviet escalation of 
force and adjustments of methods in response to unyielding 
mujahideen resistance and enduring political stalemate. It 
is important to recognize this point since otherwise one 
could get the mistaken impression that the Soviets 
controlled the course of the war throughout by always 
retaining the strategic initiative. Soviet adjustments in 
the face of continued survival by the mujahideen 
demonstrates instead that while the Soviets often were on 
the operational offensive the mujahideen had the strategic 
initiative through most of the war. In each phase of the 
war the Soviets were forced to respond to the failure of 
their military operations and continued pressure from the 
mu j ahideen. 
1. The Invasion and Its Aftermath: Miscalculation and 
Failure 
The first phase of Soviet strategy in Afghanistan 
was simple and based on expectations of immediate success; 
a massive invasion of the country with overwhelming force 
lSz~hristina Dameyer, "In Afghanistan, Soviets Find 
Replacing Islam with Communism isn't Easy," Christian Science 
Monitor, 6 August 1985, 11. 
quickly and ruthlessly seizing the capital and all major 
lines of communication. The Soviets clearly expected the 
Afghan rebels to collapse just as the Hungarians and the 
Czechs did in response to similar Soviet invasion 
strategies in those countries (although the Soviets briefly 
faced resistance in Hungary). Comparison of those Soviet 
invasions to Afghanistan makes the similarity quite clear. 154 
That the Soviets saw Afghanistan as no different than 
Czechoslovakia is further demonstrated by Joseph Collins who 
describes pre-invasion visits to Afghanistan by Generals 
Yepishev and Pavlovsky. Both had been involved at high 
levels in the invasion of Czechoslovakia and recommended 
similar actions in Afghanistan. 155 
The extent of the Soviet miscalculation of the 
situation in Afghanistan is further emphasized by Adam 
Ulamts analysis of Soviet considerations before the 
invasion. According to Ulam, Soviet calculations of the 
impact of an invasion of Afghanistan concentrated on the 
possible U.S. response. Any consideration of the response 
153 Joseph Collins, ttSoviet Military Performance in 
~fghanistan: A Preliminary Asse~sment,~~ ~6mvarative Stratew 
4 ,  no. 2 (1983). 148-154. describes the Soviet invasion 
lS4~lex P. Schmid, Soviet Militarv Interventions Since 1 9 4 5  
(New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1985) demonstrated the 
Soviet use of a %extbooktt strategy in all three invasions in 
a series of comparative case studies. 
155~ollins, "Soviet Military Performance, 1 4 9 .  
of the Afghan people to an invasion is conspicuous by its 
absence. The vacillation of the Carter administration and 
its preoccupation with Iran seemed to preclude an effective 
U.S. response to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. This 
calculation of the correlation of forces was typical for the 
Soviets who tend to be fixated with the highest (nuclear) 
end of the conflict spectrum. Yet it failed to take into 
account the moral factors and national will as emphasized by 
Clausewitz. This turned out to be a costly error, the 
lesson of which the Soviets have only begun to learn in 
retrospect. In 1988 Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Shevardnadze said in a speech that: 
The postwar experience is beginning to introduce 
substantial changes into the possibilities of force. Even 
if the force is superior, more often than not it does not 
give the aggressor the planned result, and in instances it 
becomes a sort of boomerang which strike its own 
positions. 
It is incorrect and even dangerous to appraise the 
strength or weakness of another state using the 
traditional indices without taking into account the 
staunchness of and will of its people for resistance, or 
to assess them on the basis of superficial data. 157 
The Soviets incorrectly assumed that since the fall 
of Petrograd, Budapest, and Prague had in the past been the 
key to power, as had the Bolshevik seizure of Petrograd and 
- 
lS6~dam B. Ulam, Danaerous Relations (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 254-258. 
157 Eduard Shevardnadze, "The 19th All-Union CPSU 
Conference: Foreign Policy and Dipl~macy,'~ International 
Affairs USSR, October 1988, 17. 
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Moscow, the fall of Kabul would have the same effect. 
Failure to consider the kind of intangibles discussed by 
Shevardnadze meant that the initial Soviet strategy was 
based on false assumptions that invited disaster. The 
combination of Islam as a source of resistance and the very 
nature of Afghan society, both ignored in Soviet pre- 
invasion calculations, proved to be almost insurmountable 
obstacles to Soviet control of ~fghanistan.'~' 
Having miscalculated the chances for resistance, the 
Soviets blundered further by invading Afghanistan with 
category I1 and I11 mobilization divisions fleshed out with 
Soviet Central Asians. This illustrates the Soviet 
expectation that no significant military operations would be 
required (especially extensive counterinsurgency operations) 
once the capital had been secured. Their decision to use 
Central Asian soldiers in the interest of rapid mobilization 
and surprise and disregarding intangibles such as race and 
religious affinity illustrates the Soviet perception of the 
invasion as a standard operation. The Soviet error was 
quickly evident when the Central Asian soldiers soon proved 
more likely to collaborate with the rebels than fight 
15'See Eden Naby, "The Concept of Jihad in Opposition to 
Communist Rule: Turkestan and Afghanistan," Studies in - 
Com~arative Communism 14, no. 3/4 (Autumn/Winter 1986) : 287- 
300; and Anthony Arnold, "The Stony Path to Afghan Socialism: 
Problems of Sovietization in an Alpine Muslim S~ciety,~' Orbis 
29, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 40-57. 
them. The Central Asian soldiers were replaced by 
February 1980. 
This marked the end of the first phase of the war in 
Afghanistan; a phase marked by miscalculation, shock, and 
efforts to adjust to unexpected realities. It is impossible 
to say whether the Soviets would have opted against invasion 
had they made less ethnocentric, more realistic appraisal. 
One is inclined to believe that the Soviets, in view of the 
world correlation of forces, would have proceeded but 
perhaps with more realistic expectations and, as a result, 
with a more effective operational approach. As it was, the 
Soviet invasion only intensified mujahideen resistance by 
recasting the conflict as a Jihad against foreign infidels. 
By February 1980, when the redeployment of troops indicated 
growing Soviet realization of the nature of the conflict, 
the Soviets were committed to what would be a long and 
costly war. 
2. February 1980 to Se~tember 1986: The Period of 
Soviet Domination 
Once the initial invasion strategy failed the 
Soviets quickly turned to a strategy of all out, countrywide 
warfare against the resistance. The Soviet troop commitment 
quickly expanded to about 100,000 troops, organized under 
the 40th Army. This army comprised six motorized rifle 
"'~lex Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush, Soviet Central Asian 
Soldiers in Afcrhanistan (Santa Monica: Rand, January 1981) : N- 
1634-NA. 
divisions, five air assault brigades, airborne/ranger units, 
as many as 650 helicopters of all types (including about 240 
gunships) and several squadrons of attack aircraft including 
MiG-2ls, MiG-23s, and SU-25s. In addition, as many as 
40,000 remaining troops of the Afghan Army (approximately 
40,000 deserted after the invasion) were available for 
counterinsurgency operations and occupation duties. 160 
Employing these forces the Soviets began to follow 
an offensive strategy against the mujahideen in the 
countryside. During the first year the Soviets remained 
tied to roads while using their armored vehicles in 
conventional attacks against rebel positions. These 
operations were generally ineffective and although the 
rebels were under pressure the Soviet position in 
Afghanistan deteriorated to the point that only about ten 
percent of the country was under Soviet control. The rest 
was either under rebel control or changed hands as often as 
troops of the opposing sides moved across it (a condition 
I 
favorable to the rebels). 16' As in the campaign against the 
Basmachi, the Soviet forces performed two functions: 
occupation and counterinsurgency. According to Alex 
Alexiev, 75 percent of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan were 
160~ollins, tlSoviet Military Performance, It 154 ; and John - 
ional Defense Review Hannon, ItPaktia Obser~ations,~~ mernat 
(November 1985): 1733-1735. 
161~ollins, "Soviet Performan~e,~~ 154-155. 
devoted to occupation duties that consisted mostly of 
security for important installations and transportation 
arteries. 16' Counterinsurgency missions were performed by 
airborne, assault, and reconnaissance troops, often lumped 
together by outside observers as spetsnaz. These troops 
made up 15 to 20 percent of the Soviet troops and bore the 
brunt of combat. Their missions included operations in 
the mountains against mujahidin strongholds, securing 
mountain passes and setting up ambushes. The 
counterinsurgency forces typically operated in no larger 
than company formation and during 1985 and 1986 they reached 
their peak of effectiveness, costing the mujahideen numerous 
casualties. 165 
It was during the second year of the occupation that 
the Soviets began to develop these more flexible tactics 
against the mujahideen, including heavier use of 
helicopters, air assault forces, and smaller units. Yet the 
Soviets remained preoccupied with controlling the cities and 
roadways and essentially yielded the countryside to the 
rebels. In addition, by 1982, the third year of the 
16'~lex Alexiev, hanistan 
(Santa Monica: Rand, May 1988, R-3627-A). 
163~lexiev, ,Inside the Soviet Amv in Afahanistgn, 27-28. 
164 Alexiev, Inside the Soviet in Afuhanistan, 27. 
16'~dward Girardet , "Afghanistan: The Soviets Get 
Tougher, -, 27 December 1985, 1 and 
8. 
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occupation, the Soviets were apparently returning to the use 
of larger units (at least battalion size) in attacks on the 
rebels.166 Through the rest of the war, Soviet ground 
operations would be a combination of large unit "hammer and 
anvilw sweeps against the rebels and smaller more 
sophisticated operations as described by Alex Alexiev. 
It was during this period of mounting frustration, 
when the existing doctrine, training, and equipment were all 
proving unsuited to the counterinsurgent environment, that 
the Soviets increased their troop commitment to between 
120,000 and 150,000 and extended the war to the population 
in general. The Soviets began to try to disrupt the rebel 
logistical lines into Pakistan and at the same time tried to 
separate the rebels from a sympathetic and helpful populace. 
Soviet methods included high altitude carpet bombing of the 
countryside, large scale use of chemical weapons 
(concentrated on the rebel supply routes), deliberate 
destruction of villages suspected of aiding the rebels, 
extensive mine-laying (including toy mines Znd mining of 
agricultural fields-eventually totally up to 30,000,000 
mines),16' and destruction of crops and irrigation systems. 
The terror tactics developed during this period worked to a 
166~avid C. Isby, olSoviet Tactics in the War in 
Afghanistan," Jane's Defence Review 4, no. 7 (1983), 689. 
167 Steve Lohr, ~lMoscow's Millions of Deadly Seeds: Afghan 
Mines," New York Times, 2 March 1989, A3. 
limited degree (in some areas over 80 percent of Soviet 
inflicted casualties were civilian) and continued to the end 
of the war.16' It was during this period that western 
reporter's assessments of the rebel's chances were the 
bleakest. The Soviet's all-out warfare against the entire 
population of Afghanistan was read at that time as a signal 
of Soviet determination to see the war through to the end; 
in retrospect it was clearly a policy born of desperation 
and confusion. 
The mujahideen resistance continued but their 
efforts were weakened by factionalism and their morale 
eroded by the increasing effects of unrestrained warfare by 
the Soviets. Yet the new Soviet efforts failed on two 
counts; in terms of the non-military counterinsurgency 
program, they tended to negate the social-political programs 
of the sovietization program and in military terms, they 
hurt the rebels but failed to extend Soviet control over new 
territory or consolidate it in areas of Soviet garrisons. 
In fact, the mujahideen were able to keep large portions of 
the peasant population on the land by developing an 
underground government including schools, hospitals, and 
postage stamps. In addition, as Alex Alexiev pointed out, 
16'~lex Alexiev, "Soviet Strategy and the Mujahideen," 
Orbis 29, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 33. 
16%ary Ann Weaver, "Young Afghan Represents New Breed of 
Guerrilla Leader," -r, 21 March 1986, 
1 and 10. 
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the improvement in Soviet military performance against the 
rebels was due largely to the Soviet's complete domination 
of the air. The tenuous nature of the Soviet's improved 
condition was proven by the rapid decline of Soviet fortunes 
after the introduction of the Stinger SAM. 
3. Se~tember 1986 to February 1989: The Muiahideen 
pesuraence 
September 1986 was the turning point of the war. On 
the 26th of that month the mujahideen used the U.S. supplied 
Stinger missile for the first time.170 Alex Alexiev cites 
one source that attributes 270 downed aircraft to the 
Stinger between October 1986 and September 1987.'~' The 
Stinger placed severe constraints on Soviet ground support 
air operations and provided new operational freedom of 
movement to the mujahideen. The erosion of mujahideen 
morale and effectiveness was reversed and by late 1987 a 
military stalemate was evident as were political gains by 
the rebels. The new air defense capabilities allowed the 
mujahideen to develop further the governmental 
infrastructure that had taken root in 1983-84. The rebels 
established 
170pear, "Arming Afghan Guerrillas, AU. 
171~lexiev, "Inside the Soviet Army, 33. 
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hundreds more health centers, schools, and agricultural 
projects . 172 
The Soviets seemed incapable of making operational 
and tactical adjustments beyond those that had been made in 
the early stages of the war (about 1980 to 1982). The 
difficulties and divisions of the occupying army described 
by ~lexiev must have been exacerbated by the aura of 
declining Soviet fortunes that existed after late 1986. On 
the other hand, the increased morale that the success of the 
Stinger brought to the rebels inspired greater cooperation 
among the various mujahideen factions. 173 
By late 1987 the Soviets were sending signals that 
they would seek a way to withdraw. Both the political 
leadership and the military had had enough and were 
unwilling to make greater sacrifices for unlikely returns. 
The Soviet military estimated that victory was still 
18theoretically possiblell but only if the troop commitment 
was tri~1ed.l~~ This was apparently a much higher cost than 
the Soviet leadership was willing to pay. In February 1988 
Gorbachev announced a plan for withdrawal and Soviet troops 
17'~dward Girardet , "Afghanistan War Defies Political 
Soluti~n,~~ Christian Science Monitor, 21 December 1987. 
173~d~ard Girardet, "Afghan Fighters Slowly Erode Soviet 
Control," Christian Science Monitor, 23 December 1987, 7 and 
8. 
17'paul Quinn-Judge, %oviet Military in Afghanistan Said 
to Strongly Favor Withdrawal," Christian Science Monitor, 10 
February 1988, 1. 
began leaving Afghanistan on 15 March. The withdrawal was 
completed on 15 February 1989. 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
Several ironies stand out in the Soviet defeat. The 
first is that national will, ignored by the soviets at the 
outset of the war, was ultimately the cause of their defeat; 
both the abundance of the Afghan will to resist and the 
relative lack of Soviet will to win. The Sdviets apparently 
eschewed a strategy of escalation and went almost 
immediately to the maximum troop level thatthey were 
willing to commit (between 120,000 and 150,000 or about 2 
percent of the total Soviet ground force). The Soviets did 
not have the will to triple their troop coditment in 
pursuit of victory. One clue to this lack of Soviet will is 
C 
their efforts, identified by Alexiev, to keep casualties to 
l 
a minimum and to disperse them as much as possible among the '+ 
Soviet population. The political motivations for this 
policy (in light of the unpopularity of thelwar among 
civilians and the military) are clear and were probably 
reinforced by the operationalization of the Marxist theory 
I 
of just and unjust wars that was demonstrated by the war in 
Afghanistan. 176 I 
I 
175~lexiev, Inside the Soviet Armv in Afahanistan, 24. 
I - 
I 176~s described by Christopher Jones,, "Just Wars and - 
Limited Wars: Restraints on the Use of the Soviet Armed 
 force^,^^ World Politics 28, no. 1 (October 1975): 44-68. 
Nicholas Daniloff, "Afghan War Finally Hits Soviets' Home 
A second irony is the failure of the Soviet use of 
technology (the Mi-24 and the Su-25, for example) to bring 
victory but the crucial contribution of technology (the 
Stinger) to Soviet defeat. The lesson seems to be that 
technology alone will not bring victory to counterinsurgent 
, 
forces that lack effective counterinsurgent doctrine and 
training. On the other hand, technology can apparently give 
an all important edge to committed, effective insurgent 
forces. 
The final irony is the price that the Soviets, as 
Clausewitzian as they are in their approach to war, paid for 
ignoring important Clausewitzian principles. The Soviet 
failure to subordinate war to politics is described above. 
An additional oversight on their part was their failure, 
while calculating the correlation of forces, to consider the 
conditions existing in Afghanistan that favored a guerrilla 
resistance. Clausewitz described five general conditions 
under which a general uprising could be effective: 
- The war must be fought in the interior of the country. 
- It must not be decided in a single stroke. 
- The theatre of operations must be fairly large. 
Front," U.S. News and World Revort, 16 December 1985, 41-42 
describes the Soviet population's negative response to the 
war. 
- The national character must be suited to that type of 
war. 
- The country must be rough and inaccessible. 177 
Had the Soviets been less disdainful of insurgent and 
counterinsurgent warfare, they might have considered these 
conditions more closely, and, seeing their near perfect 
applicability to ~fghanistan, been less willing to rush to 
the aid of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. 
The Soviet army faced an additional obstacle to victory; 
its own character and the character of its military and 
political leadership. One analyst of guerrilla warfare has 
noted that: "Regular troops ... even when employing irregular 
tactics, operate from a governmental, legal base, and appear 
to suffer from attitudinal and structural inhibitions that 
must first be recognized if they are to be overcome. 178 
The centralized, group-oriented nature of Soviet society 
would certainly magnify the inhibition that one would 
normally expect in regular troops, further decreasing the 
effectiveness of troops already operating outside the limits 
of their doctrinal training. 
17'carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael 
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1976)) 480. 
17'peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrilla's in the 1960's 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962): 43-44. 
VI. 
The Soviets fought successfully three of the four major 
anti-Soviet insurgencies described in this paper. However, 
their defeat in the latest conflict, Afghanistan, has 
overshadowed their earlier victories and created the 
perception of Soviet inability to win in counterinsurgency 
warfare. The magnitude of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan 
appears to validate this perception; one of the two greatest 
military powers in the world, operating almost without 
restraint, was unable to defeat the small irregular forces 
of one of the least developed countries on earth. 
Certainly, as described above, the Soviets displayed in 
Afghanistan several shortcomings of political perception and 
military doctrine and structure which, if uncorrected, could 
lead to defeat in future counterinsurgent campaigns. 
However, it is also important to realize that the 
international context of the war in Afghanistan was vastly 
different from that of the earlier counterinsurgent 
campaigns. As noted in Chapter V, the Soviets had 
calculated that the United States and other western nations 
would stay out of the conflict. Based on the United States1 
historic disinterest in Afghanistan, this was a reasonable 
conclusion. When the U.S. and several other nations 
responded to the invasion with support for the rebels and 
pressure on the Soviets the war took a turn that the Soviets 
had not expected and which put many factors of the war 
beyond their control. The fact that the mujahideen were 
never isolated from aid, refuge, or political support was an 
important break from the past pattern of Soviet 
counterinsurgencies and proved crucial to the rebel's 
victory. 17s 
Examination of the campaigns in Turkestan, Lithuania, 
and the Ukraine nullifies the generalization that the 
Soviets are incapable of winning a counterinsurgent war. It 
is clear that, quite to the contrary, the Soviets are 
entirely capable of defeating an insurgency. In three cases 
they applied sufficient will and force to defeat major 
insurgencies. Although not codified in the scientific, 
comprehensive framework of Soviet military thought, which 
includes theory, doctrine, and strategy, similar methods of 
applying political will and military force were used in all 
four cases. In effect, a de facto doctrine of counterinsur- 
gency emerged during the struggle in Turkestan and, with 
17901ivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afahanistan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) : 207-218, 
describes mujahideen contact with the West. See Robert Pear, 
'@Arming Afghan Guerrillas: A Huge Effort Led by U.S. ," New 
York Times, 18 April 1988, A1 and All for a description of the 
international support network of the rebels and the amount of 
aid provided. Edward Girardet, "Reporting Afghanistan's 
Brutal War," Christian Science Monitoy, 24 December 1987, 10, 
describes Soviet efforts to block media reports of the Afghan 
war. 
modifications and variations, was employed in each 
succeeding counterinsurgency campaign. 180 
A. THE DE FACT0 SOVIET COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE 
The de facto doctrine employed by the Soviets against 
four insurgencies corresponds to what Thomas Hammond calls 
the anatomy of communist takeovers. In essence the doctrine 
has as its prototype the Bolshevik seizure of power and the 
subsequent power consolidation methods used by Lenin and 
Stalin. This use of the methods of revolution is not 
surprising in light of the Soviet definition of insurgency 
against communist regimes as counterrevolution (1.B). 
Hammond describes six elements of the Bolshevik 
takeover: the use of armed force, the use of propaganda, 
ruthlessness, the party (as the "organizational weapon"), 
planning (and control by the party), use of camouflage (of 
the actual intentions of the party). Each of these 
appeared in varying degrees in the Soviet counterinsurgency 
campaigns between 1918 and 1988. 
1. The Use of Force 
Force has been the dominant factor in the cases 
examined here. Even in Turkestan, where the Soviets were 
most successful in weakening the resistance through 
180~ome patterns of Soviet counterinsurgency were 
identified in Paschall, "Marxist Counterinsurgencies," 5-6. 
lal"~he Basmachi," Central Asian Review, 248. 
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political measures, military force, "the sheer weight of 
Russian arms," was still the deciding factor. 182 In 
Lithuania and the Ukraine the Soviets relied much less on 
political compromise than they had in Turkestan and military 
force played an even greater role in the defeat of the 
resistance. In Afghanistan, military force was again 
dominant even as the Kabul regime sought to pacify the 
resistance through programs of llnational conciliati~n.~ 
There, however, the all out military efforts of the Soviets 
seemed only to inspire stronger resistance yet force 
remained the backbone of the Soviet effort even after the 
accession to power of the seemingly progressive Gorbachev. 183 
2. Partv Control and the Urban Bias 
Although force has played the major role in 
defeating anti-Soviet insurgencies, the party has remained 
in control of the planning and execution of counterinsurgent 
strategies. The turnaround of the campaign against the 
Basmachi by Turkkomissia is the most striking example of 
party control but party dominance in the Ukrainian, 
Lithuanian and Afghan campaigns is also clear. 
Perhaps the obvious Soviet preoccupation with 
securing urban areas and lines of communication in an 
18'"~he Basmachirll Central Asian Review, 248. 
le31n fact, the tempo of Soviet military operations 
increased. See Edward Girardet, "The Soviets Get TougherIq8 
Christian Science Monitor, 27 December 1983, 1. 
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insurgency is a result of the close control that the party 
exercises over counterinsurgent strategies. The Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union has an historic sense of 
ambivalence and even disdain for the peasants and the 
countryside they occupy that dates from Lenings time. The 
Bolsheviks were urbanites and made their revolution in the 
cities. Although they needed the support of the peasants to 
seize power and then to survive, they retained their urban 
bias and this seems to show through in the Soviet approach 
to counterinsurgency: just as revolution must be made first 
in the cities, counterrevolution must first be defeated in 
the cities. In Turkestan, Lithuania, and the Ukraine, where 
the Soviets had sufficient forces to secure the cities, 
occupy the countryside, and still pursue the insurgents, 
this approach worked. In Afghanistan the Soviets were 
forced by insufficient manpower to choose between 
counterinsurgency operations, securing the roads and cities, 
and occupying the countryside. Not surprisingly, the 
Soviets decided to secure the cities at the expense of 
occupying the countryside or devoting more troops to 
counterinsurgency. This helped to create the stalemate 
which eventually wore down Soviet resolve in Afghanistan. 
1s4~aschall, "Marxist Counterinsurgencies, 5-6, notes the 
urban emphasis of Soviet counterinsurgency. 
3. What Constitutes Ruthlessness in Soviet Counter- 
insursency 
Since Hammond points out ruthlessness as another 
hallmark of communist takeovers, it should be no surprise 
that the party which displayed unlimited ruthlessness in its 
acquisition and consolidation of power should be equally 
ruthless in its defense of that power.lB5 The four case 
studies provide ample evidence of Soviet "ruthlessnessg8 in 
counterinsurgency. In each case a military campaign 
intended to intimidate the populace as well as destroy the 
insurgents was combined with political programs intended to 
purge the population of elements of resistance. Taken 
together, the various methods that the Soviets employ place 
the costs of the insurgent struggle on the entire population 
creating, in effect, a universal program of collective 
responsibility designed to erode resistance support. 
185 Heller and Nekrich, Uto~ia in Power, 50-200, provides 
a good general description of the early development of the 
"Red Terror" and all its components: collective 
responsibility, informant networks, mass arrests, summary 
executions and deportations--all of which reappear as Soviet 
counterinsurgency methods. They also note, on page 64, the 
Bolsheviks methods of dividing their opposition through the 
o~atomization8~ of society. This also appears in each 
counterinsurgency case as propaganda efforts to factionalize 
the resistance, efforts through collectivization and de- 
kulakization to create class tensions and the use of ethnic 
militias. Paschall, I1Marxist Co~nterinsurgencies,~~ 5-6, notes 
both Soviet use of deportations and ethnic militias but gives 
too much credit to the militias for enabling the Soviets to 
"divide and conquer." As noted above, militias taken from the 
local population generally proved unreliable and this was 
especially the case in Afghanistan. 
4. Prowaaanda and Deception 
Propaganda and deception, or t8camouflage88 as Hammond 
calls it, of the party's true intentions, established by 
Lenin, Trotsky, and the other founding fathers, also found 
their way into the Soviet's counterinsurgency toolbox. In 
Turkestan they made a significant contribution to Soviet 
victory but in Lithuania and the Ukraine, where the Soviets 
relied on a more direct military approach, they played a 
more minor role. The Soviets made heavy use of propaganda 
and camouflage in Afghanistan but could not counteract the 
impact of their equally heavy reliance on armed violence on 
Muslim perceptions. 
B. VARIATIONS IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Comparison of the four major Soviet counterinsurgency 
campaigns makes clear that a pattern or "de facto doctrinet8 
has developed. Yet it is equally clear that Soviet methods 
have varied in significant ways from case to case. There 
are three striking variations: dominance of the army in two 
of the cases and NKVD operational control in the other two, 
much less inclination to achieve the goals of the campaign 
through compromise and camouflage in Lithuania and the 
Ukraine than in the two Muslim insurgencies, and less 
willingness to take casualties in the two Muslim 
insurgencies. 
1. The Predominance of the NKVD or the An@y 
The wartime origins of the insurgencies in Lithuania 
and the Ukraine and their proximity to the Soviet heartland 
may explain some of the differences. Unlike the two Muslim 
insurgencies, which were conflicts in their own right, the 
Ukrainian and Lithuanian uprisings began as rear area 
security problems for the Soviets in the wake of the German 
retreat. As a result, NKVD security forces took the lead in 
counterinsurgent operations and continued in that role after 
the war even though the proportion of army troops involved 
increased after warts end. 
2. Political Com~romise versus Militarv Force 
The blunt approach of the Soviets in the post-war 
insurgencies, heavily reliant on force and nearly devoid of 
conciliatory political moves, contrast sharply with the 
ttcamouflagedw methods used against the Muslim insurgents. 
Here again, the occurrence of the insurgencies during a war 
(threatening rear area security) and near the strategic 
heartland of Russia must have inspired the more forceful 
response. Additionally, the greater strength of the two 
Muslim insurgencies probably forced Soviet use of 
alternative methods. 
3. Tolerance of Casualties 
The obvious Soviet efforts in Afghanistan to avoid 
casualties, even at the expense of operational 
effectiveness, is the most intriguing variation. combined 
with the problems of just wars and limited wars outlined by 
Chris Jones and noted in the preceding chapter, this has 
done much to raise doubts about Soviet counterinsurgent 
capabilities. But, as noted in Chapter 111, this 
sensitivity to casualties was evident to some degree during 
the anti-Basmachi campaign. On the other hand, LFA and UPA 
forces found the Soviets willing to take heavy casualties, 
sending "wave after wave' of troops against defensive 
positions. Again it is likely that the Soviets perceived 
the Ukrainian and Lithuanian uprisings as more direct 
threats to Soviet power, especially before tne end of World 
War 11. Afghanistan was more likely to be seen as 
peripheral to Soviet security and interests while excessive 
casualties might prove to be more destabilizing than the 
conflict itself. The perception of Turkestan as peripheral 
may also have been true to a lesser extent and the relative 
volatility of the Russian populace, as evidenced by the 
Kronstadt Revolt, may also have increased the Bolshevik 
desire to minimize casualties. 
The implication is that any assessment of Soviet 
counterinsurgency capabilities based on Afghanistan must 
take into account Soviet perceptions of the relative threat 
to Soviet power or interests that any particular conflict 
may represent. This idea should cast the numerous 
186~ys-~rokhmali~k, UPA Warfare in Ukraine, 221-224 ; and 
Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast, 85. 
generalizations about Soviet counterinsurgent capabilities 
inspired by Afghanistan into a new light. Although the 
Soviet military and its political masters had not developed 
a doctrine of counterinsurgency, in three instances the 
Soviets were sufficiently motivated to defeat insurgencies, 
even at the higher cost that their doctrinal unpreparedness 
imposed. 
C. CONDITIONS FOR DEFEAT IN AFGHANISTAN 
Why, then, did the Soviets succeed against three 
insurgencies in spite of their lack of doctrine or training 
geared to the special demands of counterinsurgency but fail 
against a fourth? The answer lies in several factors that 
the Soviets had no control over. This raises again the 
point discussed in Chapter V that Afghanistan may have been 
unwinnable (all we know is that it was not winnable by the 
methods the Soviets used) but that the Soviets could have 
achieved a marginal increase in effectiveness had they 
developed an actual, instead of de facto, doctrine. This 
may have been the margin for victory or limited gains 
instead of the apparent total defeat that Afghanistan 
became. Instead, it is clear that the conditions of the 
three earlier campaigns heavily favored the Soviets but that 
under more challenging conditions, the Soviet shortcomings 
came into play. Finally, it is important to realize that a 
truly effective doctrine of counterinsurgency should offer 
an analytical framework for deciding whether or not to 
commit resources to a particular conflict,,in the first 
place. This may be the most important lesson of Afghanistan 
for the Soviets. 
1. ion 
Afghanistan was the largest and most difficult 
counterinsurgency campaign that the Soviets ever faced in 
terms of both geography and population. The country covers 
647,000 square kilometers of territory and had a population 
of 14,183,671. la' By comparison, Lithuania has a total area 
of only 42,000 square kilometers and, in 1939, had a 
population of 3,000,000. Ia8 The Western Ukraine encompassed 
88,000 square kilometers and had a population during the 
insurgency of 4,400,000 to 5,600,000. lsS The uprising in 
Turkestan was nearly as large as the Afghan resistance, the 
combined areas of the separate movements that made up the 
Basmachi encompassing nearly 500,000 square kilometers. It 
is impossible to say how much of Turkestanls population of 
12,000,000 lived within the contested areas. lS0 The Soviets, 
"'central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987): 1-2. 
'%auras, #er Coast, 6. 
18%arples, "The Kulak in Post-War USSR: The West 
Ukrainian Example," 560. 
lsopaul E. ~ydolph, Geoara~hv of the USSR (Elkhart Lake, 
Wisconsin: Misty Valley Publishing, 1979), 20-21; and Carr, 
The Bolshevik Revolution, 330. 
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however, enjoyed the advantage of having 500,000 Russian 
settlers in Turkestan. This offered a militia manpower pool 
as well as a source of intelligence on enemy movements, 
essential to successful counterinsurgency and rarely enjoyed 
by counterinsurgent forces and obviously absent in 
Afghanistan. 
The topography of Lithuania offered little refuge 
for the LFA, the country is generally level grasslands and 
plains with 17 percent of the land forested.'" In the 
Ukraine the UPA was able to use the Carpathians for refuge 
but this limited their area of operations to the westernmost 
Ukraine and the range of 500 to 1500 meters in elevation did 
not significantly hinder the Soviet  force^."^ Turkestan was 
a much more challenging area of operations because of its 
rugged terrain with mountains ranging between 2000 and 6000 
meters. Is3 However, much of the contested areas of Turkestan 
were lowlands, such as the Fergana Valley, where the 
Basmachi gained no advantage over the Red Army forces. The 
Soviets were forced to fight in rugged terrain in 
Afghanistan, which is almost entirely mountainous, with 
lsl~ean Gottmann, A Geocrravhv of EUrODe (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 753. 
182~ydolph, Geocrrawhv of the USSR, 42. 
ls3Lydolph, Geocrra~hv of the USSR, 101. 
elevations ranging up to 5000 meters. Is' As noted in 
chapters two and five, in Afghanistan the Soviets felt 
immediately their lack of training in counterinsurgency and 
mountain warfare. 
2. Isolation and External Sumort 
several other factors that favored the Soviets in 
the three earlier campaigns but hindered their efforts in 
Afghanistan are rooted in the Soviet ability to isolate the 
Basmachi, the LFA, and the UPA and their inability to 
isolate the Mujahidin. The Soviets were able to close the 
Afghan border to the Basmachi and to force Afghanistan to 
suspend the limited assistance it had provided to the 
rebels. The Basmachi therefore had no source of outside 
support and no refuge. The UPA and LFA were even more 
isolated since they were surrounded by communist territory. 
They, like the Basmachi, carried on their struggle with no 
outside support or access to a place of refuge. The 
Afghans, on the other hand, carried on their struggle in the 
age of superpower competition. As a consequence, they had a 
source of outside support and, in Pakistan, a refuge. In 
addition, the Soviets found it impossible to keep the 
conflict out of the news and so paid a high price in terms 
of prestige and image. Afghanistan also created internal 
pressures both on the homefront and in the Soviet A m y  that 
'"~ouis Dupree, Afshanistan (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980): 5-8. 
the Soviets had never encountered during a counterinsurgency 
campaign before. Simply put, the Soviets found that they 
could no longer fight whatever kind of war they desired 
against rebels. They found that they now faced potential 
consequences for their actions including worsened relations 
with the United States, the Muslim World, and China. 
As a result, the de facto doctrine, which had been 
sufficient under less challenging circumstances, proved 
ineffective against the Mujahidin and costly to the 
achievement of other Soviet goals. Relying too heavily on 
force and having too few doctrinal constraints, the Soviets 
finally paid for their long neglect of the problems of 
counterinsurgency, identified in the West as early as 1968. 
The Leninist-Stalinist methods of counterinsurgency, just 
like so much else from that era, seem to have outlived 
their usefulness in the age of Soviet reform. 
D. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE AFTER AFGHANISTAN 
There is evidence, described in Chapter V, that the 
experience in Afghanistan has stimulated greater Soviet 
attention to counterinsurgency. There is little evidence, 
however, that this renewed interest has had any permanent 
effect above the operational and tactical level. Soviet 
military journals have begun to examine the problems of 
tllocal wars" and mountain warfare but have mostly confined 
themselves to the tactical problems encountered in those 
situations. The only change at the doctrinal level that is 
evident is the counterinsurgency and mountain warfare 
training that troops going to Afghanistan began to 
receive. lg5 Whether this sort of training will be continued 
now that the Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan remains 
to be seen. It is also uncertain at this stage whether 
Afghanistan will inspire development of a Soviet theory, 
doctrine, and strategy of counterinsurgency. The military 
was obviously unresponsive to previous experiences against 
insurgents but, as difficult as those previous campaigns 
were, they were not defeats. The institutional trauma of 
defeat by poorly armed, untrained Central Asians may break 
the previous pattern. The costs of not answering beforehand 
the questions posed by Marshal Grechko must now be obvious 
to the Soviets so it seems reasonable to expect significant 
change in Soviet military doctrine in the coming years. 
195~lexiev, Inside the Soviet Army in Afahanistan, 14-15. 
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VII . CONCLUSION 
\ 
It is clear that the Soviets were essentially blind to 
the difficulties of counterinsurgent warfare before 1979. - 
i 
Their prior experience had been with internal uprisings 
against which they had vast advantages and in advising 
allies engaged in lower intensity civil wars. Afghanistan 
was, no doubt, an eye opening experience that will force the 
Soviets to reconsider the ffexternal functionll of their armed 
forces which they so confidently described during the 
seventies. The lesson of Afghanistan will likely restrain 
the Soviet use of armed force in the foreseeable future. 
One must anticipate, however, that the shock of losing the 
\ longest war in their history (and losing a war for the first 
time since the Russo-Polish war of 1921) will motivate the 
development of a Soviet theory and doctrine of 
counterinsurgency. There is evidence that the Soviet 
military is already reexamining its experience and the 
experience of western counterinsurgent forces. So far, this 
reexamination has been confined to questions at the 
operational and tactical level. lee Afghanistan may provide 
lS6~ee Mark N. Katz, "Anti-Soviet Insurgencies: Growing . - 
Trend or Passing Phase?" Q&& 30, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 361- 
391; and Valerii Konovalov, 8tAfghanistan and Mountain Warfare 
Training," Radio Liberv ~esearsh Bulletin 32, no. 12 (23 March 
1988) : RL 118/88. 
the experiential feedback necessary to develop a military 
theory of counterinsurgency and, in turn, a counterinsur- 
gency doctrine. 
v 
Soviet theory, doctrine, and strategy have as their goal 
-. the anticipation of and preparation for future forms of 
warfare. Clearly, the Soviets failed to do this in the case 
of Afghanistan. They entered into a war that appears in 
retrospect to have been nearly unwinnable with no 
appropriate doctrine or training. Before they realized 
their blunder they were committed to the war and could not 
avoid its costly outcome. The impact of the war on the 
Soviet armed forces and Soviet society will not be fully 
known for years. The West must, however, anticipate some 
degree of change in Soviet doctrine, probably significant 
I 
change, as the result of the war. 
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